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EMERGENCY TAKINGS
Brian Angelo Lee*
Takings law has long contained a puzzle. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution requires the government to pay "just compensation" to owners of
private property that the government "takes." In ordinary circumstances, this
requirement applies equally whether the property is confiscated or destroyed,
and it also applies to property confiscated in emergencies. Remarkably, how-
ever, courts have repeatedly held that if the government destroys property to
address an emergency, then a "necessity exception" relieves the government of
any obligation to compensate the owner of the property that was sacrificed for
the public good. Although the roots of this startling principle stretch back for
centuries, existing literature offers neither a systematic analysis of the justifi-
cations that have been offered for the principle nor a developed normative
account of what the correct approach should be. This Article seeks to remedy
both of these significant gaps in the current understanding of takings law. The
Article identifies three pivotal but commonly overlooked distinctions and ex-
plains how they interact to provide a general theory of compensation for emer-
gency takings. First is a distinction among different roles that compensation
may play in any given situation. Second is a distinction between two different
types of "necessity," each of which has a different normative implication.
Third is a distinction among amounts of compensation that might be owed.
Recognizing these distinctions in turn reveals why the main justifications of
the necessity exception are unpersuasive, why courts nevertheless so often have
been inclined to endorse that exception, and what the correct approach to
emergency takings actually is: when the need to destroy property in an emer-
gency is accompanied by grave constraints on the ability to pay compensation,
then an obligation to pay just compensation" for the destroyed property re-
mains, but the amount of that compensation changes. Under such circum-
stances, what justice requires is partial compensation.
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INTRODUCTION
Takings law has long contained a puzzle. The Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution explicitly requires the government to compensate owners
of property that the government "takes" for public use.' Ordinarily this re-
quirement applies equally whether the government confiscates the property
through eminent domain or destroys the property without taking possession
of it.2 This consistent requirement to pay compensation is unsurprising,
since the owner's loss is the same whether the government destroys the
property or puts it to some other use.3 Even if a crisis gives rise to extraordi-
nary circumstances, the government still owes compensation to owners of
private property that the government confiscated and used to address the
emergency. 4 One naturally would expect, therefore, that the same rule would
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In 1897 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment "incorporated" the Fifth Amendment's just-compensation requirement and
therefore made that requirement binding on state governments. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). Many state constitutions contain similar provisions.
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19, cl. a; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. a.
2. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960); see also United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946).
3. Cf Causby, 328 U.S. at 261 (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943)) ("It is
the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the property
taken.").
4. See, e.g., Standard-Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 195, 196-97 (Ct. Cl.
1955); Chi. League Ball Club v. City of Chicago, 77 Ill. App. 124, 138-39 (1898); cf United
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apply when the government destroys private property to address an emer-
gency. Remarkably, however, courts have repeatedly held that if the govern-
ment responds to an emergency by destroying private property altogether,
instead of merely confiscating and using it, then the owner ceases to be enti-
tled to any compensation.5 Although the government has directly inflicted a
potentially enormous loss on the innocent and unfortunate property owner
in order to benefit others in the community, the government owes the
owner nothing. Many courts at many different levels have affirmed this ex-
emption from paying compensation, which, for convenience, one might call
the "noncompensation principle."6 Indeed, courts and scholars have said
that the noncompensation principle has been well-established law for
centuries.
7
Nevertheless, on its face, this noncompensation principle is quite puz-
zling. From the property owner's perspective, there is no significant differ-
ence between the government's confiscating the property to use it and the
government's destroying the property. In both cases, the effect on the prop-
erty owner is the same-she is deprived of the property that she once had.
And yet despite this fundamental equivalence, in one case the government
must compensate her for her loss, and in the other it need not.
Others have recognized the puzzling nature of this principle. For exam-
ple, the authors of the Second Restatement of Torts, while acknowledging
the rule's existence, assert that "the moral obligation to compensate the per-
son whose property has been damaged or destroyed for the public good is
States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1952) (addressing prior Supreme Court cases that
had required compensation and distinguishing them on the grounds that those cases involved
wartime use rather than destruction).
5. See, e.g., Caltex, 344 U.S. at 152-53; see also cases discussed infra Parts II and IV.
6. See, e.g., cases discussed infra Part III. Existing literature sometimes refers to the
assertion as the "conflagration rule," because many of the cases invoking this principle have
involved destruction to create firebreaks. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY:
TAKINGS 118-19 (2002). However, because the assertion appears in a wide range of contexts
beyond fires, this Article will use a more general name. Likewise, this Article will avoid the
term "necessity exception" because one of this Article's central contentions is that distinguish-
ing among different types of "necessity" is essential.
7. See, e.g., Caltex, 344 U.S. at 154 ("[T]he common law had long recognized that in
times of imminent peril.., the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few
that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved."); 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET
AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 118 (2d ed. 2011) (referring to the "time-honored example" of
destruction of a house to create a firebreak in a conflagration); cf Workman v. New York City,
179 U.S. 552, 584 (1900) (Gray, Brewer, Shiras & Peckham, JJ., dissenting) (referring to the
"ancient rule" that, in the context of destruction in public emergencies, "a thing for the com-
monwealth every man may do without being liable to an action" (quoting The King's Preroga-
tive in Saltpetre, (1606) 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (K.B.); 12 Co. Rep. 12)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS app. § 196 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (asserting that "[e]ntry upon the land of another
to prevent or mitigate the effects of an impending public disaster is upheld by many old dicta"
and citing cases from the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries as support).
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obviously very great, and is of the kind which should be recognized by the
law."' Some academic commenters have expressed similar sentiments.9
These scattered criticisms, however, have not offered any systematic
analysis of the justifications that have been offered for the noncompensation
principle, nor made any attempt to explain why courts so often have en-
dorsed that principle despite its apparent incompatibility with other key fea-
tures of takings law. These deficiencies, in turn, have prevented existing
literature from being able to offer a rigorously grounded foundation for an
alternative approach.
This gap in the current understanding of takings law is particularly un-
fortunate in light of the noncompensation principle's influence on other
contested areas of property law, especially regulatory takings. For example,
both the majority and a dissent in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a
seminal regulatory-takings case, cite emergency-destruction cases in support
of their respective analyses.' 0 Moreover, the principle's potential practical
implications are growing. Today the scope of government emergency de-
struction has expanded beyond classic paradigms of urban fires and wartime
emergencies to include activities as diverse as law enforcement, storm and
flood mitigation, and disease eradication." (This last category's significance
may continue to grow as governments around the world increasingly seek to
avert deadly global pandemics by destroying potential vectors, such as poul-
try and livestock, that may incubate and transmit new infectious diseases.12)
Hence, a comprehensive analysis of the government's obligations with
respect to emergency takings is long overdue. This Article aims to fill this
gap, both by providing a detailed critical examination of the main argu-
ments that courts and commentators have offered over the past two centu-
ries in defense of the noncompensation principle and by developing an
account of what the correct approach should be.
Accomplishing these tasks, this Article argues, requires recognizing three
crucial distinctions that both courts and commentators have overlooked.
First, this Article distinguishes between the different roles that compen-
sation can have in any given interaction. Discussions of emergency takings
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. h.
9. See, e.g., DOBBS ET AL., supra note 7, § 119, at 367-68 ("If the city was not in fact
saved but the plaintiffs property was intentionally damaged or destroyed by a city's agent, it is
still right that the public as a whole bear the costs of harms inflicted to serve public purposes
rather than that the individual be forced to sacrifice his property for the good of others.");
Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The Doubtful Case for Public Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV. 127
(2013); Derek T. Muller, Note, "As Much upon Tradition as upon Principle": A Critique of the
Privilege of Necessity Destruction Under the Fifth Amendment, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 481
(2006). For a similar example from a century ago, see Henry C. Hall & John H. Wigmore,
Compensation for Property Destroyed to Stop the Spread of a Conflagration, 1 ILL. L. REV. 501,
514-24 (1907).
10. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. See infra Section I.C.
12. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 41-42.
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routinely assume that the purpose of requiring the government to pay com-
pensation for takings is to serve as restitution for the wrong done to owners
by inflicting a property loss on them.13 Under this assumption, establishing
that destruction in emergencies is not wrongful would be sufficient to show
that no compensation is owed. This Article argues, however, that rectifying
wrongs is only one role that compensation may play. The role that compen-
sation actually does play in takings generally, and in emergency takings spe-
cifically, is importantly different.
The second pivotal distinction is between two different types of "neces-
sity." Defenses of denying compensation to owners of destroyed property
commonly rely heavily on assertions that the destruction was "necessary"
under the circumstances. The underlying assumption is that the presence of
"necessity" eliminates any obligation to compensate those who suffered the
costs of that destruction.' 4 Such arguments overlook a crucial distinction
between two different types of necessity-"destruction necessity" and
"noncompensation necessity." While the former type of necessity is relevant
for determining whether destroying property without the owner's consent
may be permissible, only the latter type is relevant to answering the separate
question of whether compensation is owed for that destruction. This Article
argues that recognizing the distinction between these two forms of "neces-
sity" provides the key to understanding two pieces of the emergency-takings
puzzle: it unlocks the ability to understand both how the noncompensation
principle diverges from the correct approach to emergency-takings compen-
sation and why, nevertheless, courts and commentators have so often found
that principle appealing.
When both destruction necessity and noncompensation necessity are
present, the third overlooked distinction becomes relevant. A common as-
sumption in many areas of law, including discussions of emergency destruc-
tion, is that the amount of compensation owed in any given case must be
either full compensation (if the plaintiff prevails) or zero compensation (if
the defendant prevails). Between those two extremes, however, lies an entire
spectrum of potential intermediate amounts of compensation, and this Arti-
cle argues that when noncompensation necessity is present in the aftermath
of an emergency, the proper amount of compensation may be neither full
compensation nor zero compensation, but rather partial compensation.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes some prominent
examples of emergency destruction to provide a concrete foundation for the
subsequent discussion. Part II introduces the three pivotal distinctions that
13. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 56.
14. One note about terminology. Although this Article is concerned with situations that
are commonly referred to as situations of "necessity," for the sake of clarity this Article gener-
ally refers to them as "emergencies," because "necessity" is sometimes also invoked to justify
ordinary eminent-domain confiscations of property, confiscations which unquestionably do
require compensation. Use of "emergency" in this context, although not common, is also not
unique. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1851) ("It is the emer-
gency that gives the right, and the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be
justified.").
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courts and commentators have commonly overlooked and explains how
they interact to provide a general theory of compensation for emergency
destruction.
Part III builds on the discussion in Part II to provide a systematic exam-
ination and critique of the leading attempted justifications of the noncom-
pensation principle. The Part sorts these justifications thematically into four
categories: The first category focuses on questions of efficient incentives. The
second focuses on attributions of responsibility for the destruction-specifi-
cally focusing on attempts to remove responsibility from the government by
asserting either that the threatening condition itself was really responsible
for the destruction or that the destroyed property was analogous to a nui-
sance and therefore could be abated without compensation. The third cate-
gory asserts that providing monetary compensation would be superfluous
for one of three reasons: (1) the owner of the destroyed property has already
received sufficient nonmonetary in-kind compensation, (2) private insur-
ance is an adequate substitute for government-provided compensation, or
(3) the risk of opportunism in emergency-destruction situations is suffi-
ciently low that requiring the government to pay compensation is unneces-
sary. The fourth category of justifications of the noncompensation principle
asserts that emergency destruction is fundamentally distinct from eminent
domain, and thus immune to the latter's constitutional obligation to pay
compensation. This distinction rests on the grounds that either the govern-
ment-ordered destruction was no different from what private individuals
have a natural right to do, or that-in the case of wartime emergency de-
struction-the destruction was similar to ordinary "battle damage," which is
not compensable. Drawing on the three distinctions identified in Part II, this
Part shows why each of these traditional justifications is largely
unpersuasive.
Part IV then addresses the question of why, nevertheless, courts have so
often found the noncompensation principle attractive. This Part shows how
the distinctions drawn in Part II illuminate the judicial history, revealing
both that it is less definitive than commonly asserted and that it in fact
supports the partial-compensation approach introduced in Part II.
I. DESTRUCTION IN ACTION
To set the stage for the discussion to follow, a few brief examples of
emergency-destruction situations in practice may be helpful.
A. Conflagrations
Historically, many seminal discussions of the noncompensation princi-
ple have involved the government's destruction of property to create fire-
breaks. One particularly fertile source of litigation was the Great New York
Fire of 1835, which broke out on a December night in what was then New
York City's warehouse district, near Wall Street."5 High winds drove the fire
15. See 5 I.N. PHELPS STOKES, THE ICONOGRAPHY OF MANHATTAN ISLAND 1735 (1926).
[Vol. 114:391
Emergency Takings
relentlessly forward, while bitterly cold temperatures froze the water in fire
hydrants, rendering them useless.' 6 As the hours passed, the situation grew
increasingly desperate. An eyewitness recalled that:
[b]y midnight it was evident that no earthly power could stay the then [sic]
Etna-like rapid progress of the raging torrent, which increased every mo-
ment most alarmingly, and spread in every direction, except toward the
east .... Who can tell where the calamity would have paused, for there
were immense blocks of wooden buildings on Water and Cherry and Pearl
Streets ... and inflammable magazines which, once fired, could extend the
common destruction over the city.1
7
The fire was contained only after the mayor ordered the demolition of sev-
eral warehouses that had not yet been emptied of the goods stored inside.' s
A New York statute had provided for compensating owners of buildings
destroyed by public officials to create a firebreak, but that law made no pro-
vision for the owners of goods that had been stored in those buildings and
destroyed as a result of the demolition.' 9 The predictable result was a long
series of lawsuits by the goods' owners demanding compensation for their
losses. 20
The 1835 fire was not unique. Demolition of buildings to create fire-
breaks was a common tactic for fighting the vast urban fires of the nine-
teenth century.21 Although improved fire-safety and firefighting technology
have mitigated the need for urban firebreaks, destruction of property to cre-
ate firebreaks ahead of advancing forest fires or wildfires is still common.22
16. TERRY GOLWAY, SO OTHERS MIGHT LIVE: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK'S BRAVEST: THE
FDNY FROM 1700 TO THE PRESENT 44-45 (2002).
17. WILLIAM L. STONE, HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY 472 (New York, Virtue & Yorston
1872) (reporting the reminiscences of Gabriel P. Disosway).
18. Id. at 475.
19. See Russell v. Mayor of New York, 2 Denio 461, 461-65 (N.Y. 1845).
20. See, e.g., Am. Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590 (N.J. 1851); Mayor of New York
v. Lord, 17 Wend. 285 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 18 Wend. 126 (N.Y. 1837).
21. See, e.g., Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853) (resolving a suit for compensation for
property destroyed to fight a fire in San Francisco); see also F.E. FROTHINGHAM, THE BOSTON
FIRE 10 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1873) (describing the demolition of sixty buildings in a futile
effort to stop the spread of the Great Boston Fire); J.H. GOODSELL & C.M. GOODSELL, THE
CHICAGO FIRE AND THE FIRE INSURANCE COMPANIES 17 (New York, The Spectator 1871)
(describing the use of demolitions to stop the Great Chicago Fire of 1871).
22. See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (addressing
a takings claim arising out of the Forest Service's destruction of $6.6 million of timber to fight
a forest fire). Several states have statutes authorizing compensation for property comman-
deered for use in an emergency but, in strikingly similar language, exempting from those
provisions timber or other property destroyed to create a firebreak. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 12-75-124 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 252.43 (West 2015); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 418.154
(West 2014).
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B. Wartime Destruction
A prominent example of wartime emergency takings arose out of the fall
of Manila at the start of World War II. Mere hours after the attack on Pearl
Harbor in December 1941, Imperial Japan began a sustained assault on the
Philippines Islands.23 Slow to react, the U.S. Army quickly lost much of the
air power that it had been relying on for its defense of the islands, and
successful Japanese strikes against local naval facilities caused the American
fleet to withdraw. 24 Further deterioration in the Allied military situation was
steady and rapid. Less than three weeks after the initial attacks, General
MacArthur declared Manila an open city, and desperately retreating Ameri-
can forces began to destroy resources that might be useful to the advancing
Japanese. 25
Among those resources was Caltex's Manila petroleum depot, which
U.S. forces had been using as a source of fuel.26 The U.S. Army destroyed
Caltex's transportation vehicles and key parts of the facility's machinery; it
also opened the spigots of the petroleum tanks, emptying their contents into
a nearby river. The U.S. government compensated Caltex-an American
company-for the fuel and equipment that the Army used, and for the fuel
and transport vehicles that it destroyed. But it refused to pay compensation
for the destroyed facilities.
After the war, Caltex sued the U.S. government, seeking compensation
for those facilities. The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which
invoked the noncompensation principle to deny Caltex's claim. 27
The facts in Caltex were not unique. Prominent cases addressing emer-
gency takings by the military have arisen both out of traditional wars, such
as the American War for Independence, 28 the Mexican-American War,29 and
the Civil War,30 as well as out of domestic disturbances, such as a revolution
in Arizona during the Civil War3 and riots in the Panama Canal Zone.3 2
Recent cases have involved a 1998 cruise missile strike against an alleged
terrorist target in Sudan 33 and the First Battle of Fallujah in 2004 in Iraq.34
23. For a general account of the Japanese invasion, see Louis MORTON, THE WAR IN THE
PACIFIC: THE FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES (Kent Roberts Greenfield ed., 1953). An especially
vivid ground-level view of the chaos and confusion that enveloped the collapsing U.S. forces
appears in W.L. WHITE, THEY WERE EXPENDABLE (1942).
24. MORTON, supra note 23, at 88, 96-97.
25. Id. at 232-35.
26. Caltex was a joint venture of Standard Oil of California and Texaco. ("Caltex" was a
combination of the two parent companies' names.)
27. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
28. See, e.g., Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (Pa. 1788).
29. See Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871).
31. See Grant v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 41 (1863).
32. Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
33. E1-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
34. Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546 (2010).
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C. Crime, Disease, and Floods
Police activities to apprehend criminal suspects are also a fertile source
of emergency-takings claims. 3s For example, suits have sought compensation
for the destruction of windows (and other property damage) when a SWAT
team shot tear gas and "flash-bang" grenades into a house to flush out flee-
ing suspects after a gun battle;3 6 for the loss of a home when police set it on
fire to help capture escaped prisoners who had taken refuge there; 37 and for
the impossibility of inhabiting a home after the police removed two walls in
the process of collecting evidence during a felony investigation.3"
The need to limit infectious diseases has produced another, globally
prominent, set of examples of emergency destruction. Destroying buildings
to prevent the spread of infection has historically been one important strat-
egy for protecting public health.3 9 Airborne pathogens also can threaten eco-
nomically valuable plants and orchards, requiring the destruction of
vegetation that could function as a conduit for the blight.40 Perhaps the most
familiar use of emergency destruction in the farming context today lies in
the destruction of healthy poultry and livestock to prevent them from trans-
mitting diseases that are deadly to farm animals or, potentially, to human
beings.4 1 Emergency destruction of farm animals to address emerging strains
of avian influenza ("bird flu") has been especially prominent worldwide.4 2
35. For general discussions of police-related emergency-destruction cases, see Charles E.
Cohen, Takings Analysis of Police Destruction of Innocent Owners' Property in the Course of Law
Enforcement: The View from Five State Supreme Courts, 34 McGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2002); C.
Wayne Owen, Jr., Note, Everyone Benefits, Everyone Pays: Does the Fifth Amendment Mandate
Compensation When Property Is Damaged During the Course of Police Activities?, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 277 (2000); Lior J. Strahilevitz, Case Note, When the Taking Itself Is Just
Compensation, 107 YALE L.J. 1975 (1998).
36. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38, 39 (Minn. 1991).
37. Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1980).
38. Eggleston v. Pierce County, 64 P.3d 618, 621 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). The walls
themselves were taken away as evidence.
39. See, e.g., Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (1909) (addressing claims
arising out of the U.S. military's demolition of several buildings to prevent the spread of
yellow fever during the Spanish-American War).
40. See, e.g., Terence J. Centner, Legitimate Exercises of the Police Power or Compensable
Takings: Courts May Recognize Private Property Rights, 7 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 191 (2011) (dis-
cussing litigation arising out of Florida's destruction of trees in an effort to stop the spread of
citrus canker); cf Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
41. See, e.g., Judge Upholds Killing of Vermont Sheep in 'Mad Cow' Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
2, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/02/us/udge-upholds-killing-of-vermont-sheep-in-
mad-cow-case.html. For a general discussion of this issue in the United States, see Stephen Ott,
Issues Associated with US Livestock Disease Compensation in the 21st Century, in THE ECONOM-
ICS OF LIVESTOCK DISEASE INSURANCE 68 (S.R. Koontz et al. eds., 2006); see also Two Months
that Changed the Face of Rural Britain, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/1316726/Two-months-that-changed-the-face-of-rural-Britain.html (offering
a timeline of the start of the 2001 "foot and mouth" disease crisis that required livestock
destruction in Britain).
42. See, e.g., Mike Hughlett, Bird Flu Outbreak Could Last for Years, STAR TRIB. (Minne-
apolis), Apr. 17, 2015, at Al (describing millions of dollars in costs from destroying poultry as
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As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, the need for such prop-
erty destruction is likely to grow even more common.
Just as increased global trade and travel increase the potential need to
destroy property to avert pandemics, changes in global climate increase the
potential need for governments to destroy property to address the risk of
devastating flooding.43 In some cases, the government itself is responsible for
flooding certain property to reduce risks to other property. For example,
after the Ohio River, swollen by days of heavy rainfall, was predicted to crest
at a record high level, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers deliberately
breached a levee at Bird's Point, Missouri, to divert the water over thousands
of acres of privately owned farmland to reduce the flooding risk to the town
of Cairo, Illinois. 44 The demolition occurred despite fierce opposition from
the owners of the affected farmland.45
In other cases, the government destroys property to create barriers to
floods. For example, in the aftermath of "Superstorm Sandy," New Jersey
(using federal disaster funds) sought to purchase and demolish hundreds of
seashore homes so that "the land will be permanently preserved as open
space .... [to] serve as natural buffers against future storms and floods." 46
The Blue Acres project could proceed by means of ordinary purchases,
rather than by condemnation, because the state offered to purchase storm-
damaged property at its pre-storm market value.47 Hence, owners were more
than happy to sell.48 Less generously funded government purchase programs
a result of bird flu outbreak in midwestern United States); 112,000 Chickens Destroyed After
Bird Flu Outbreak, S. CHINA MORNING PosT (Apr. 14, 2014, 5:14 AM), http://www.scmp.com/
newslasia/article/1481263/112000-chickens-destroyed-after-bird-flu-outbreak (describing de-
struction in Japan).
43. Although climate change may make this issue more prominent, the issue has deep
historical roots and is not limited to destruction by official government agents. See, e.g., New-
comb v. Tisdale, 62 Cal. 575, 575-76 (1881) (holding that necessity was a possible defense
against a trespass suit for flooding caused by breaching a levee).
44. Stephen Deere, Missouri Farmland Swamped After Levee Breach to Help Cairo, Ill., ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH (May 3, 2011, 1:45 PM), http://www.stltoday.com/article_3c73c9f8-
74ff- 11e0-a74d-0019bb30f31a.html.
45. Stephen Deere & Tim O'Neil, Leaders Lining Up for, Against Army Corps Levee-Breach
Plan, Evacuation Continues, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:10 AM), http://www
.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/leaders-lining-up-for-against-army-corps-levee-breach-plan/
article_d808ecOO-fb8f-53ba-b44a-1b1f21c43ea8.html. Similar controversy had attended breach
of the same levee in 1937. See Robert Koenig, First Birds Point Breach and 'Levee Rebellion'
Happened 75 Years Ago, ST. Louis BEACON (Jan. 24, 2012, 10:38 AM), https://www.stlbeacon
.org/#!/content/ 1254/first_birds-point-breach and leveerebellion-happened_75.yearsago.
46. State of N.J. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, Blue Acres Buyout Program, RENEWIERSEY-
STRONGER, http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/homeowners/blue-acres-buyout-program/
(last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
47. See N.J. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., SCOPE OF WORK FOR BLUE ACRES APPRAISAL SER-
VICES (Apr. 2014), http://www.nj.gov/dep/greenacres/pdf/BlueAcresAppraisalSOW_2014-
04_withHOF.pdf.
48. See, e.g., Susan Loyer, Christie Announces Milestone Purchase Under Sandy Blue Acres
Buyout Program, MYCENTRALJERSEY.COM (Oct. 30, 2014, 12:12 PM), http://www.mycentraljer
sey.com/story/news/local/middlesex-county/2014/ 1 0/29/govemor-visited-south-river-announc
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might be expected to face more difficulties. Such losses from government
efforts to address flooding may grow in importance if, as predicted, ongoing
changes in global climate will increase weather variability and the severity of
major storms.49
Because the firebreak and wartime cases have shaped the law on emer-
gency takings the most, this Article's discussion focuses on those two types
of emergency destruction. To the extent that this Article's analysis is con-
vincing, however, its application to other contexts should be
straightforward.
II. UNDERSTANDING NECESSITY
A crucial first step in understanding and evaluating the noncompensa-
tion principle is recognizing three pivotal distinctions that discussions of
emergency takings have routinely overlooked. First is a distinction among
different roles that compensation may play in an interaction. Second is a
distinction between two different types of necessity-destruction necessity
and noncompensation necessity-each of which has different implications
for the permissibility of actions taken in response to that necessity. And
third is a refined distinction among the amounts of compensation that may
be owed in any given case, moving beyond a rigid dichotomy between full
compensation and zero compensation to recognize that, when noncompen-
sation necessity is present, the just amount of compensation may be partial
compensation. The following discussion elaborates on each of these three
distinctions and identifies some of their key implications.
A. Compensation's Varied Roles
The first distinction is among the roles that compensation may play
when people interact. Before one can determine whether compensation is
owed in a given situation, it is essential to understand what purpose com-
pensation would serve in that situation. Accordingly, a brief catalog of some
of compensation's possible roles will be useful.
The role that is perhaps most familiar to lawyers, or at least to litigators,
is to serve as restitution or punishment for a wrong that the person paying
compensation inflicted on the person receiving compensation. In property
law, trespass damages are a straightforward example of compensation in this
role. The owner of property on which an intentional trespass has occurred is
entitled to compensation for the harm that the trespasser's incursion caused.
Even if the owner suffered no physical or monetary loss, that owner is still
entitled to at least nominal damages and may be able to obtain punitive
ed-milestones-sandy-blue-acres-buyout-program/18152401 (quoting Deanna Glova, a former
resident, saying "I am so grateful for the buyouts .... I lived so close to the river[,] and I
wouldn't have been able to sell it.").
49. See, e.g., Future Climate Change, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/fu
ture.html (last updated July 21, 2015).
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damages as well.5 0 Because the trespasser's violation of the owner's right to
exclude has wronged the owner, the trespasser must pay compensation.
But redressing wrongs is only one of several possible roles that compen-
sation may play in interpersonal interactions. A second possible role is to
alleviate a loss that was not caused by anyone's wrongful action, and perhaps
not caused by human action at all. Examples of compensation playing this
role include insurance policies against losses from natural disasters such as
storms; workers' compensation programs, which pay compensation to
workers injured on the job whether or not there was any wrongdoing by
their employers;"' and the maritime law of general average, which redistrib-
utes the losses suffered when cargo is jettisoned at sea in an emergency,
spreading the loss among all who had cargo aboard the vessel saved by the
jettison.12
A third role for compensation appears in claims arising out of the
breach of a contract in circumstances in which the breach is not itself neces-
sarily wrongful. For example, the prominent literature on "efficient breach"
of contracts places compensation in this role.53
Fourth is what might be called "constitutive compensation," compensa-
tion that is a part of a compound action and has the effect of legitimizing
that action.5 4 For example, if Jones enters Smith's grocery store, picks up a
loaf of bread, and then hands Smith a sum of money equal to the price
marked on the bread, Jones's paying that sum is part of a compound ac-
tion-in this example, a voluntary sale-and the payment creates a valid
transaction. Jones is not giving the money to Smith as restitution for having
wronged Smith by taking the bread, nor is the payment an additional act to
help Smith recover from the loss of the bread. Jones is giving the money to
complete the transaction, thereby making the bread acquisition legitimate.
Although Jones owes Smith the compensation that Smith demands in ex-
change for transferring ownership of the bread, Jones commits no wrong in
this situation unless she takes the bread without paying the required
amount.
50. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
51. See, e.g., JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUC-
TIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 22 (2010).
52. See, e.g., Raymond P. Hayden & Kipp C. Leland, General Average - Issues to Consider,
23 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 103, 104-08 (2010).
53. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CON-
TRACTS 22-23 (2010); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
304-10 (2004).
54. The idea of certain acts being important as constituents of some desirable end rather
than as instrumental means of bringing about some wholly distinct end can trace its lineage as
far back as Aristotle. For a seminal discussion of this idea, see JOHN M. COOPER, REASON AND
HUMAN GOOD IN ARISTOTLE 81-82 (1975). Cooper's analysis explicitly built on ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, at 46-48 (L.H.G. Greenwood ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1909) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (noting a distinction between "component" and "external" means
and suggesting that Aristotle himself failed fully to grasp the importance of the distinction).
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In this shop example, the interaction between the two parties is volun-
tary. However, compensation can play a similar role in interactions that are
not mutually voluntary. Particularly relevant for present purposes are situa-
tions in which one party inflicts harm on another without that other per-
son's consent, giving rise to a duty to pay compensation for the imposed
loss, but because the reasons for imposing the harm were sufficiently com-
pelling, the payment of adequate compensation is sufficient to make that
infliction of harm not be wrongful. In such circumstances, the payment of
adequate compensation is part of a legitimate compound action of inflicting
compensated harms, and a wrong will arise only if the adequate amount of
compensation is not paid.5
A natural question is which of these roles compensation plays in the
takings context. In discussions of emergency takings, and sometimes takings
in general, a typical but often tacit assumption has been that compensation's
role is to rectify a wrong suffered by owners who have been compelled to
relinquish their property involuntarily. 6 On this view, arguing that the gov-
ernment commits no wrong when it destroys property to address an emer-
gency is sufficient to defend the noncompensation principle. If there has
been no wrong, then there obviously is no just claim for restitution. William
Lawrence, a prominent nineteenth-century congressman, offered an em-
phatically clear articulation of this view in the context of wartime emergency
destruction: "[t]o require the government to pay where it is guilty of no
wrong, in the exercise of both a right recognised by the civilized world and
enjoined by the highest duty and for the common good, would be the harsh-
est rule that could be recognised."5 7
But the assumption that the purpose of takings compensation is to rec-
tify a wrong is implausible. Eminent domain has long been considered to be
55. Gregory Keating has offered a general analysis of such cases in tort law. Gregory C.
Keating, Responsibility in Tort for Innocent and Justified Wrongs (Aug. 14, 2014) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author); cf Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of
Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 418-21 (1959) (distinguishing between "fault" and "conditional
fault").
56. See, e.g., Katrina Miriam Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 239, 249 (2007); cf Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972) (men-
tioning eminent domain as an example of a liability rule protecting an entitlement, rather than
as a situation in which the relevant public interest causes the owner's entitlement to vanish).
Considering emergency destruction through the lens of tort law has deep historical roots. See,
e.g., Maleverer v. Spinke (1537) 73 Eng. Rep. 79 (K.B.) 81 ("Yet we will well agree that in some
cases a man may justify the commission of a tort, and that is in cases where it sounds for the
public good; as in time of war a man may justify making fortifications on another's land
without licence; also a man may justify pulling down an [sic] house on fire for the safety of the
neighbouring houses; for these are cases of the common weal.").
57. This assertion first appeared in a series of articles published in the American Law
Register. Wm. Lawrence, War Claims Against the United States, [1874] 13 AM. L. REG. 265, 403.
Lawrence later edited those articles into a congressional committee report advocating the re-
jection of certain claims arising out of the Civil War. See H.R. REP. No. 43-134, at 283 (1875).
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a power inherent in every sovereign. 8 It would be odd, to say the least, to
assert that sovereignty necessarily includes a power to do a specific sort of
wrong. Moreover, if some action is wrong to do, then when the state (or
anyone else) is deciding whether to do that action, the correct decision is
simply not to do it, rather than to do it and pay compensation. Hence, if the
compensation provided for exercises of eminent domain really were com-
pensation for a wrong, then the proper conclusion would be that the state
should stop exercising its power of eminent domain altogether. But the
state's power of eminent domain is now so rooted in practice, and so amply
justified by theory, that the implication that the state should never exercise
the power lacks credibility. It is no surprise, therefore, that modern judicial
language has avoided treating takings as wrongs. For example, in First En-
glish Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, a reg-
ulatory-takings case, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause "is designed not to limit the governmental
interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in
the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking."' 9
It is evident, therefore, that compensation's role in eminent domain
must not be to provide restitution for a wrong, but rather to help ensure
that a wrong does not occur, by serving as a constituent part of a legitimate
(albeit compelled) transfer.60 Because takings compensation is not paid to
redress a wrong, it further follows that showing that the government's de-
struction of property in an emergency was not wrongful does not, by itself,
resolve whether the government owes compensation as a result of con-
ducting that destruction. There are two distinct questions that need to be
answered separately: whether an act is permissible, and whether compensa-
tion must be paid in conjunction with that act to make the interaction
legitimate.
B. Two Types of Necessity
Perhaps even more important than the first distinction is a second over-
looked distinction between two very different types of "necessity." If a public
official destroys a building to stop an out-of-control fire from spreading to
the rest of the city, one may ask if that destruction was really necessary. If
58. See, e.g., Grant v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 41, 43 (1863) ("[Eminent domain] is of the
very essence of sovereignty ...."); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 339
(New York, 0. Halsted 2d ed. 1832) ("The right of eminent domain, or inherent sovereign
power . . . is admitted by all publicists. ); 1 JULIus L. SACKMAN ET AL., NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 1 (3d ed., rev. 2015).
59. 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987).
60. See also Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 80 (2012)
("Paying just compensation transforms what otherwise would have been an impermissible
governmental act into a permissible one under the Takings Clause ...."); cf Mayor of New
York v. Lord, 17 Wend. 285, 303 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (Bronson, J., dissenting) ("The destruc-
tion of individual property, for the public safety, bears a strong analogy to the case of taking
private property for the public use. In both cases the act is legal: it only amounts to a forced
sale; and damages mean nothing more than compensation or value.").
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the consequences of allowing the fire to spread would have been much
graver than the loss of the destroyed building, and if destroying the building
was the only practical means of stopping the fire, then one might plausibly
conclude that "necessity" did indeed compel the destruction.6 1 Thus, one
type of "necessity" is the necessity to perform some act, such as crossing a
property line to avoid an onrushing vehicle, or consuming some resource
(such as food in a stranger's cabin when one is lost in the woods), or de-
stroying property to thwart a grave threat. In the emergency-destruction
context, a natural name for this sort of necessity is "destruction necessity."
62
Showing the presence of destruction necessity answers the question of
whether the destruction was permissible, but it does not answer every rele-
vant question. 61 In particular, it does not answer the crucial second question
of whether compensation is owed as part of that act to make the act
legitimate .64
The presence of destruction necessity may legitimize destroying prop-
erty without the owner's permission, but by itself it does no more: it cannot
legitimize refusing to compensate the property owner for the loss caused by
the destruction. This is because the payment (or refusal) of compensation
for property destroyed to address a threat does not affect the destruction's
ability to stop threats.65 For example, a firebreak's effectiveness depends en-
tirely on the laws of physics, not on whether anyone paid money to the
owner of the destroyed property. Thus, even if destruction necessity com-
pelled the demolition, it did not compel destroying the property without
compensating the owner.
Because the question whether destruction is justified is distinct from the
question whether compensation is required in conjunction with that de-
struction, if some "necessity" is to justify not paying compensation, it will
61. Precisely identifying necessity's normative implications is a potentially complex task.
For example, killing an innocent person may remain wrong even when doing so is the only
possible way to stop the deaths of two other innocent people and therefore is "necessary" in
some sense. For the purpose of understanding emergency destruction, all that is important is
that at least sometimes necessity can genuinely be exculpatory.
62. Similar names might be used in other contexts. For example, in cases involving de-
fendants tying vessels to piers, without permission, to ride out a storm, one might talk of
"mooring necessity." For examples of such cases, see Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124
N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910); Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). The fundamental idea com-
mon to all of these specific variant terms is to refer to the necessity of performing the action
that caused the loss.
63. Cf Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100, 101 (Mass. 1891) (Holmes, J.) (asserting that
although a decision to destroy a diseased animal in an emergency cannot be delayed to allow
for a hearing, "it does not follow" that a decision not to compensate the animal's owner also
does not require a hearing).
64. Cf Hall & Wigmore, supra note 9, at 517 n. 10 (criticizing William Lawrence's de-
fense of the noncompensation principle for failing to "observe the distinction between the
officer's justifiable trespass and the government's duty to reimburse the sacrifice").
65. In doctrinal terminology, destruction necessity creates only an "incomplete privi-
lege" to destroy. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions
of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARv. L. Rv. 307 (1926).
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have to be a second type of necessity, different from destruction necessity in
its sources and implications. For convenience, one may refer to this type of
necessity as "noncompensation necessity." 66
Noncompensation necessity can spring from two different sources-ad-
ministrative constraints and fiscal constraints. Administrative-noncompen-
sation necessity arises when, as a practical matter, it is infeasible to
determine either who has a legitimate claim for compensation or what the
legitimate size of that claim is.67 For example, in the chaos of a headlong
retreat in wartime, all relevant documentation may be lost (if there was an
opportunity to create it in the first place), and those who were involved in
wartime destruction may end up not surviving the conflict, or may have
fuzzy memories years later when the war is over and a claim for compensa-
tion is litigated.68 In such circumstances, administrative limitations make
paying less than full compensation necessary.
Fiscal-noncompensation necessity arises when limitations on the rele-
vant party's available wealth restrict its ability to pay full compensation, in-
dependent of how easy it may be to determine accurately who is owed
compensation and what the full amount of compensation would be. Indi-
viduals are especially likely to experience fiscal-noncompensation necessity
in emergency-destruction situations, but even governments may do so in the
aftermath of a catastrophe's wholesale destruction of social wealth and crea-
tion of enormous recovery costs.
Noncompensation necessity has obvious parallels with destruction ne-
cessity, since in both situations acting contrary to that necessity may not be
strictly impossible but may be too costly to be justly demanded. The norma-
tive implications of noncompensation necessity will likely depend on the
extent to which the inability to pay is a result of culpable behavior by the
party owing the compensation. In standard sorts of emergency destruction,
however, any inability to pay compensation is likely to be nonculpable, and
for the sake of simplicity, the discussion here assumes nonculpability.
Recognizing the distinction between questions of whether destruction is
permissible and whether compensation is owed for that destruction, and
thus between the two different types of necessity relevant to each question,
makes clear that the presence of one type of necessity does not automatically
entail the presence of the other. The presence of destruction necessity and
the presence of noncompensation necessity need to be established sepa-
rately, as do the implications of their presence in any given case. Destruction
66. For examples of some cases decided in circumstances in which noncompensation
necessity was likely significant, see infra Part IV.
67. Cf Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1214-15 (1967) (discussing
the role of "settlement costs" in utilitarian analyses of which particular takings should receive
compensation).
68. See, e.g., ALvIN P. STAUFFER, THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS: OPERATIONS IN THE WAR
AGAINST JAPAN 327 (Kent Roberts Greenfield ed., 1956) (describing how most of the records
of the local unit of the U.S. Army's Quartermaster Corps, the branch of the Army responsible
for supply, were permanently lost when the Philippines fell to the Japanese Army in 1942).
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necessity's presence makes destruction of the relevant property not wrong-
ful, even if the owner did not consent, at least as long as the appropriate
amount of compensation is paid. As the next Section discusses, however,
destruction necessity also can have a second effect: making noncompensa-
tion necessity, if present, potentially relevant for determining what amount
of compensation is in fact appropriate.
C. Partial Compensation
The third pivotal distinction that discussions of emergency takings have
routinely overlooked is among amounts of compensation that may be owed.
A customary assumption in a wide range of legal contexts is that someone
who seeks compensation for a loss is entitled either to full compensation for
the loss or no compensation, unless the plaintiff and defendant share re-
sponsibility for the loss. 69 This assumption is also ubiquitous in standard
understandings of takings law.
70
The extent to which legal remedies generally conform to this simple
binary view lies outside the scope of this Article. 71 When compensation's
role is to rectify a wrong, this binary choice between full compensation and
zero compensation might seem natural. Intuitively, a defendant who has
wronged a plaintiff owes a duty to repair that wrong fully, but if the defen-
dant did no wrong, then the defendant has nothing to repair.
In the specific case of property law, however, it is clear that remedies do
not always fit the all-or-nothing paradigm. Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed's famous distinction between protecting entitlements with a
"property rule" and protecting them with a "liability rule" is a classic exam-
ple.72 Entitlements protected by liability rules might not receive full compen-
sation when infringed, if "full" compensation is understood to be
compensation equal to what the entitlement's holder would demand in or-
der to be induced to relinquish the entitlement-that is, equal to what the
69. The law of comparative fault or comparative negligence may require splitting the cost
of the loss among the responsible parties, including the plaintiff, if the plaintiff bears some
responsibility for the loss. Although the amount of damages awarded in a comparative-fault
litigation may consequently be less than the amount of the loss suffered by the plaintiff, this
result does not really diverge from the familiar dichotomy between full compensation or zero
compensation, because each party is required to contribute the full amount of the loss attribu-
table to it. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 53, at 187.
70. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)
("[TIhe compensation must be a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken."); cf. 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139 (asserting that legislatures do not effectuate tak-
ings arbitrarily but instead by giving the burdened owners "full indemnification and
equivalent for the injury thereby sustained").
71. Complexities arise as soon as one begins to consider what constitutes "full" compen-
sation. For example, the extent to which a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to receive consequent-
ial damages can be contentious. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The
Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57,
71-72 (1999).
72. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 56, at 1092-93.
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entitlement is worth in the eyes of the holder. 73 Instead, the holder of the
entitlement receives only a sum determined by some outside entity, such as a
court or the market. One of the paradigms of Calabresi-Melamed liability-
rule protection in action is property taken through eminent domain. 74 Own-
ers of taken property are entitled only to the property's fair-market value,
irrespective of the price that the property owner would actually demand to
sell it. 75 As a result, it has long been asserted that the compensation paid to
owners of property taken through eminent domain systematically un-
dercompensates those owners.76
It is equally widely assumed that such undercompensation ideally would
not occur-that in a perfect world each owner of taken property would
receive compensation equal to his subjective assessment of that property's
value-but that in the imperfect actual world practical considerations re-
grettably require paying a lesser amount.77 Because subjective values exist
only in the minds of the owners and therefore are not directly observable by
outsiders, attempting to determine precisely what subjective value an owner
places on his property simply is too difficult and too vulnerable to dishon-
esty or self-deception by the relevant owner. As a result, the law regrettably
must rely instead on an imperfect proxy, such as market value. 71
This standard account clearly reflects a view that concerns about admin-
istrative feasibility can excuse payment of compensation that is less than
perfectly full, even in ordinary situations. In other words, full compensation
is not required in practice, because administrative limitations make paying
73. In economics terminology, "full" compensation would be equal to the entitlement
holder's reservation price for selling the entitlement. See, e.g., Ian Steedman, Reservation Price
and Reservation Demand, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 158, 158-59
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
74. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 56, at 1093.
75. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (defining "just compensa-
tion" as market value).
76. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
957, 962-67 [hereinafter Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart]; Thomas W. Merrill, The
Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 83 (1986). There is some controversy about
the size of the undercompensation. See Brian Angelo Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyn-
cratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593 (2013). But see Lee Anne Fennell,
Just Enough, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 109 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2013/08/Fennell- 113-Colum.-L.-Rev- 109.pdf (arguing that one of my arguments
in Just Undercompensation rests on a tacit assumption, which Fennell suspects is incorrect,
about the elasticity of supply in real estate markets). Fennell's observation about the unspoken
role of that assumption in the relevant argument is correct. Fennell might also be correct that
the assumption is unrealistic, but how well the assumption conforms to reality is ultimately an
empirical question that neither my nor Fennell's theoretical discussions resolve.
77. See, e.g., Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, supra note 76, at 993-94 (discussing
the "natural response" of favoring greater compensation and the problems with that
response).
78. I have elsewhere challenged this standard opinion of the fairness of less-than-full
compensation in eminent domain. See Lee, supra note 76 (arguing that in some circumstances
justice does not require compensating for property owners' idiosyncratic value in their
property).
[Vol. 114:391
Emergency Takings
less than full compensation necessary. In the terminology introduced in Sec-
tion II.B, the presence of administrative-noncompensation necessity requires
leaving the burdened owner less than whole.
This uncontroversial fact about ordinary takings law implicitly reflects
two important principles. First, whether full compensation is owed for some
action that causes a loss depends on whether necessity is present. But the
relevant necessity is not the necessity to do the action (for example, to take
some property through eminent domain) but rather the necessity not to pay
full compensation for that necessary action. That is, whether full compensa-
tion is required depends on whether one of the two forms of noncompensa-
tion necessity, administrative or fiscal, is present.
The second implicit principle is that when noncompensation necessity
in fact is present, the proper amount of compensation may be neither full
compensation nor zero compensation, but instead partial compensation.
While the existence of administrative impediments to determining the full
subjective value of an owner's loss is widely, and plausibly, taken to excuse
the government from paying compensation equal to that value, those im-
pediments do not excuse the government from paying any compensation at
all. Instead, the amount of compensation required in ordinary takings cases
is some intermediate amount.
This observation naturally raises the question of how to determine
when the presence of noncompensation necessity removes only the obliga-
tion to pay full compensation, leaving an obligation to pay partial compen-
sation intact. Here, the distinction drawn above between administrative-
noncompensation necessity and fiscal-noncompensation necessity becomes
especially relevant.
To the extent that noncompensation necessity arises from practical ad-
ministrative limitations, reducing the amount owed from full to merely par-
tial compensation may often be insufficient to alleviate the necessity. The
possibility of partial compensation might be sufficient if the source of the
necessity is difficulty in determining the true size of a claim. As noted in the
context of ordinary eminent domain, to the extent that courts are permitted
to award compensation only for objectively determinable aspects of value,
even when those aspects do not exhaust the total value that the owner places
on the relevant property, administrative feasibility may significantly in-
crease. In many cases, however, the administrative requirements for paying
partial compensation may not differ greatly from those for paying full com-
pensation, since determining who has a legitimate claim and what that
claim's size is does not become easier or more feasible depending on what
percentage of the total claim the government will in fact pay out. Accord-
ingly, the presence of administrative-noncompensation necessity may re-
quire that compensation be denied altogether.
On the other hand, in fiscal-noncompensation necessity situations the
possibility of paying only partial compensation can have a marked effect on
whether noncompensation necessity exists. The fact that the government
could not afford to compensate fully every American whose property Allied
forces destroyed during World War II, for example, does not imply that it
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could not afford to pay each of them some fraction of that property's value.
Hence, the presence of fiscal-noncompensation necessity by itself does not
plausibly eliminate every obligation to pay compensation, but only the obli-
gation to pay more compensation than is feasible. Paying a lesser amount of
compensation may be sufficient to make the corresponding harmful action
legitimate.
Note, however, that in the absence of destruction necessity the presence
of noncompensation necessity alone will not affect the amount of compen-
sation owed when the government destroys property. If there is a need to
withhold compensation but no need to destroy in the first place, then the
obvious implication is that the government is obligated to refrain from this
unnecessary destruction for which it cannot pay. If the government never-
theless does destroy the property, compensation's role actually would be to
rectify a wrong, and the amount of compensation owed would consequently
be (at least) full compensation.
As the following Part's discussion will make clear, these three key dis-
tinctions-among compensation's varied roles, between two types of neces-
sity, and among possible amounts of compensation-provide an essential
foundation for understanding and critically evaluating the arguments that
courts and commentators have advanced in seeking to justify the noncom-
pensation principle.
III. JUSTIFYING NONCOMPENSATION
Scholars and courts have offered a wide range of defenses of the
noncompensation principle over its centuries-long history, but these de-
fenses can be arranged in four thematic groups. One set of arguments fo-
cuses on incentives for socially efficient government decisionmaking. A
second set asserts that the government owes no compensation for emergency
destruction because responsibility for that destruction really lies with the
cause of the emergency or with the owner of the destroyed property, rather
than with the government. A third set argues that paying compensation
would be superfluous, either because the affected property owners have al-
ready received compensation of a nonmonetary sort, because adequate pri-
vate alternatives to public compensation exist, or because compensation is
unnecessary to deter opportunistic use of government power by small but
politically influential groups. A final set of arguments contends that the gov-
ernment owes no compensation because the government's destruction of
property in an emergency is not an exercise of its power of eminent domain
but rather of some other power, one that does not require payment of
compensation.
One general theme running through many of these arguments is that
the various reasons that might exist for requiring compensation for ordinary
exercises of eminent domain do not apply in the case of emergency takings.
A standard modern taxonomy identifies three types of justification for ordi-
narily requiring the government to compensate for taken property: one type
of justification focuses on fairness concerns and equal treatment; a second
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focuses on incentives for efficient government decisionmaking, and the third
focuses on limiting the ability of politically influential minorities to tilt the
scales of justice for their own private benefit at the expense of the public
good.79 Because the diverse range of arguments raised over the course of the
noncompensation principle's history cannot neatly be limited to these three
categories, this Part shall follow the four-part taxonomy described above.
Over the course of this discussion, however, each of the three standard justi-
fications for takings compensation will receive due attention.
Examining each of these four sets of arguments with the aid of the dis-
tinctions developed in Part II will reveal that the arguments do not plausibly
support exempting the government from paying compensation for emer-
gency destruction. At most they support only the conclusion that sometimes
full compensation may not be required.
A. Incentives for Efficient Decisions
One common argument in favor of the noncompensation principle is
that if public officials "are concerned that the government-or perhaps they
personally-may be held liable for a large compensation award, they may
not act with the requisite dispatch to avert a larger disaster."80 The Great Fire
of London provides a prominent historical example commonly invoked to
motivate this concern about incentives. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
described the incident as
a memorable instance of folly recorded in the 3 Vol. of Clarendon's History,
where it is mentioned, that the Lord Mayor of London, in 1666, when that
city was on fire, would not give directions for, or consent to, the pulling
down forty wooden houses, or to the removing the furniture, &c. belong-
ing to the Lawyers of the Temple, then on the Circuit, for fear he should be
answerable for a trespass; and in consequence of this conduct half that
great city was burnt.81
The Second Restatement of Torts refers to this story as "[a] striking illustra-
tion of the unwisdom of restricting this privilege [of entering another's
property to avert an imminent public disaster] within too narrow limits. ''82
79. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 32-52.
80. See, e.g., id. at 120; see also Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 74 (1853) ("[]f in such cases
a party [who created a firebreak by destroying a house in which goods were stored] was held
liable, it would too frequently happen, that the delay caused by the removal of the goods
would render the destruction of the house useless.").
81. Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357, 363 (Pa. 1788). Derek Muller challenges the
accuracy of the court's account of the London fire, arguing that Samuel Pepys's diary provides
evidence that London's mayor in fact was avidly destroying property in a futile effort to create
firebreaks, and that starting the demolitions earlier would not have saved the city. Muller,
supra note 9, at 489-91.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS app. § 196 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Dana
and Merrill's presentation of the incentives argument also cites Respublica's account of the
London fire. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 120.
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There are two potential concerns here. One is a concern about requiring
public officials personally to pay compensation for the destruction that they
cause in responding to public emergencies; the other is a concern about
requiring the government to pay compensation for such destruction.
The first concern is obviously compelling. No sane public official could
be counted on to order the destruction of valuable property, even when
doing so was vital to protecting the public, if by doing so the official became
obligated to pay for the value of the destroyed property out of her own
pocket. The amount owed would almost always dwarf the official's total in-
come from holding the public office, and even if the value of the property
saved was vastly greater than the value of the property destroyed, the public
official has no means of personally acquiring a portion of that preserved
value (unless the official happened to have owned some of the saved prop-
erty)."3 As a result, ordering the necessary destruction would almost cer-
tainly force the official into bankruptcy. Hence, there is a good practical
reason not to hold public officials personally liable for the costs of such
destruction, even apart from the dubious justice of simultaneously requiring
an official to bear enormous burdens alone as a result of having appropri-
ately and competently acted to protect the well-being of others, while spar-
ing those beneficiaries from any obligation to share in even part of those
costs.
For the last several decades, however, the relevant question has been
whether the government owes compensation for property that it destroys in
an emergency, not whether individual government officials do. 4 So the
modern version of the incentives argument must amount to a concern that
even when public officials are immune from any personal liability, requiring
the government to pay compensation for property that public officials de-
stroyed to protect the public in an emergency will discourage those officials
from ordering that socially beneficial destruction.
This argument against requiring compensation for emergency takings is
striking because it precisely inverts a standard argument in favor of requir-
ing compensation for takings made under the government's ordinary power
of eminent domain: if the government were not obligated to compensate
owners of taken property then the government would naturally be tempted
to take property even when doing so is socially inefficient, because the gov-
ernment could enjoy the benefits of acquiring the property without suffering
the corresponding costs that the acquisition imposed. On this theory, the
83. In law-and-economics terminology, a public official who is liable to pay compensa-
tion for the value of the destroyed property would personally internalize the costs of the emer-
gency-destruction decision even though the official has no way to personally internalize the
benefits of the decision. When officials internalize all of the costs but none of the benefits of a
certain course of action there is a near-perfect incentive for those officials to refuse to take that
course of action, no matter how harmful that refusal might be to society overall.
84. See, e.g., Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 395 U.S. 85
(1969); United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952). For a brief discussion of Robert
Brauneis's account of the historical background for this shift, see infra note 206 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 114:391
Emergency Takings
compensation requirement for eminent domain serves to dispel a "fiscal il-
lusion" about the true social costs of the relevant project by compelling the
government to internalize the costs of its takings decisions, thereby encour-
aging governments to take property only when the social benefit of doing so
actually exceeds the social cost.
8 5
The prima facie tension between these two incentives-based arguments
is now evident.86 In the ordinary eminent-domain context, requiring com-
pensation is praised as discouraging government officials from taking prop-
erty too often.17 But in the emergency-destruction context, that same
requirement to pay compensation is condemned as discouraging govern-
ment officials from taking property often enough.
Since requiring compensation has the same effect in both contexts-it
discourages takings that otherwise would occur-these two arguments will
be consistent only if, in the absence of a compensation requirement, the
government's natural tendency would be to take too much property in ordi-
nary eminent-domain situations and take too little (or exactly the right
amount) in emergencies.8 8 Only then would a disincentive provided by the
compensation requirement both beneficially moderate the government's be-
havior in ordinary circumstances and harmfully intensify the government's
behavior in emergencies.
I am not aware of any empirical evidence that the government's natural
tendency to take in ordinary circumstances exceeds its natural tendency to
take in emergencies. 89 Nor is there any obvious a priori reason to think that
85. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 41-46; see, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 53, at
129-30; Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings Compensa-
tion, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1682-83 (2010).
86. For an example of how applying the incentives-based explanation of the compensa-
tion requirement for ordinary takings would naturally lead to endorsing a compensation re-
quirement for emergency takings as well, see Strahilevitz, supra note 35, at 1979 (suggesting
that damage caused by police while apprehending a suspect might have been reduced if the
officers had believed that the state would have to pay compensation for what they destroyed).
87. Both the "fiscal illusion" argument and the emergency-destruction version of the
incentives argument rest on controversial assumptions about the motivations of government
officials. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 53, at 130; Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political
Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 140 (2006). Reaching a conclusion about
the accuracy of those assumptions is unnecessary for present purposes since, even if those
assumptions are correct, the incentives argument turns out not to vindicate the noncompensa-
tion principle and thus fails on its own terms.
88. This dichotomy is slightly simplified. The two arguments would still be consistent
even if governments were naturally inclined to take slightly too much in emergencies, as long
as that tendency both is less pronounced in emergencies than in ordinary circumstances and is
sufficiently weak that a compensation requirement's relatively large disincentive would create a
net incentive to take far too little. The pivotal question, however, remains why the govern-
ment's natural tendency to take property would be predictably less in emergency situations
than in ordinary situations.
89. The Constitution's "just compensation" requirement poses a significant obstacle to
any such empirical study, since it effectively precludes acquiring data about how governments
would behave if such a requirement did not exist.
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such a difference would exist.90 In fact, one might suspect that political in-
centives would be more likely to encourage overreaction to emergencies than
underreaction, since public officials' responsibilities are broader than just
managing the government's budget. Decisionmakers are likely to find the
immediate peril of fire or invasion to be at least as salient as future budget
issues.9' A mayor's job is to protect the city, and voters may hold that mayor
accountable for conspicuous failures to do so, irrespective of budgetary
concerns.
9 2
Furthermore, decisionmakers may not even know what the ultimate
budgetary implications of the emergency destruction decision would be, be-
cause the soundness of a community's finances depends not only on the
government's level of expenditures but also on the amount of revenue that it
can raise. Although public officials cannot themselves internalize the benefits
of destruction, governments can, because they have the power to tax. Since
the devastation wrought by an unchecked conflagration might foreseeably
cause severe damage to the community's tax base, engaging in compensated
emergency destruction might actually have milder net budgetary conse-
quences than refraining from such destruction would. As a result, the incen-
tive implications that arise in the context of public officials' concerns about
their own personal liability do not automatically translate to the context of
public officials' concerns about government liability.
In addition, a guarantee of compensation to owners of demolished
property might actually decrease public officials' reluctance to destroy prop-
erty in emergencies. Just as insurance insulates people from the adverse con-
sequences of their actions and can thus create a "moral hazard" that
encourages risky behavior, so too a compensation requirement insulates
third parties from the full adverse effects of an official's decisions to destroy
their property and thus might encourage that official to be more willing to
engage in the destruction, knowing that the owners harmed by that decision
90. In theory, a difference could arise if the government is less able to internalize the
benefits created by emergency destruction than the benefits created by ordinary eminent do-
main. In that case, one might predict a greater reluctance to take in emergencies than in
ordinary circumstances. In practice, however, the government's ability to internalize the bene-
fits provided by an ordinary public project, such as a highway, is not obviously greater than its
ability to internalize the benefits provided by addressing a devastating emergency. Therefore,
this theoretical difference seems unlikely to have actual relevance.
91. See, e.g., David Cole, No Reason to Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and
Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 1329, 1342-47 (2008) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER
& ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS
(2007)). But see GOLWAY, supra note 16, at 52 (reporting that during the Great New York Fire
of 1835, the mayor and the head of the fire department were reluctant to take direct part in
creating a firebreak, ultimately foisting the job onto James Hamilton, Alexander Hamilton's
son). Note, however, that accounts of the 1835 fire do not all agree, and Golway's account is
out of step with James Hamilton's own memoirs. See JAMES HAMILTON, REMINISCENCES OF
JAMES A. HAMILTON 285-88 (New York, Charles Scribner & Co. 1869).
92. For a similar criticism of the incentives argument, see Muller, supra note 9, at
523-24.
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will not be left destitute. 93 Moreover, this effect is possible even if public
officials are motivated less by empathy than by political self-interest. Com-
mentators have noted that paying compensation to owners of property taken
through eminent domain may decrease those owners' political opposition to
the public projects that require those takings, and there is no obvious reason
to think that the same would not also be true of postdestruction political
repercussions in the emergency context.94
Nevertheless, there is one set of circumstances in which the assumed
difference in the government's natural tendencies to take might in fact arise.
When the scale of the emergency is great, as historically was common in the
crises that shaped the development of the noncompensation principle, the
cost of paying compensation may simply be beyond the government's ability
to bear. Those circumstances are much less likely to arise in ordinary cases
than in catastrophes, with their attendant wholesale loss of wealth. In emer-
gency situations of that daunting sort, the government may face not only
destruction necessity, that is, the need to destroy property to protect the
community, but also noncompensation necessity, that is, the need not to
pay full compensation to the owners of the destroyed property. When both
sorts of necessity are present, requiring the government to pay full compen-
sation to owners of property destroyed to address an emergency indeed con-
ceivably might cause government officials to hesitate before ordering such
destruction, even when that destruction is in fact necessary. Thus, to the
extent that the incentives argument is plausible, its true implication is not
that the government should routinely be exempt from paying any compen-
sation in emergency-destruction cases, but rather that it should be exempt
from paying full compensation when noncompensation necessity accompa-
nies destruction necessity.
B. Shifting Responsibility
Another strategy for defending the noncompensation principle has been
to assert that the government owes no compensation to the owner of the
destroyed property because the government was not really responsible for
that destruction. This approach has commonly taken two forms. One ver-
sion of the argument seeks to shift responsibility from the government to the
threatening condition that gave rise to the emergency. The other version
seeks to shift responsibility to the owner of the destroyed property. Because
these two arguments are independent, each can be considered separately, as
93. For basic accounts of "moral hazard" see, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW & ECONOMICS 48 (6th ed. 2012); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation
for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 593-94 (1984). A striking example of
the phenomenon appears in Charles Haswell's memoir of the 1835 Great New York Fire.
CHAS. H. HASWELL, REMINISCENCES OF AN OCTOGENARIAN OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1816
TO 1860) 305-06 (New York, Harper & Brothers 1896) (noting that owners of valuable goods
threatened by the fire made costly efforts to move the goods to safety only "after it became
evident that all policies for insurance were of no value").
94. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 53, at 130; Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 93, at 594.
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well as a special case that arises when destruction is inevitable no matter
what the government does.
1. The Threatening Condition Is Responsible
One defense of the noncompensation principle asserts that responsibil-
ity for emergency destruction really lies with the forces that created the
emergency-for example, the fire or the invading army-rather than with
the government that acted to counteract those forces. If the government's
action was in fact necessary, the argument asserts, then it is the necessity-
or the causes of that necessity-that bear the responsibility, not the govern-
ment. And if the government was not responsible for the destruction, then it
should not be obligated to pay for the destruction. The Supreme Court may
have had this sort of argument in mind in Bowditch v. Boston, a nineteenth-
century emergency-destruction case, when it asserted that "[a]t the common
law every one had the right to destroy real and personal property, in cases of
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire, and there was no respon-
sibility on the part of such destroyer, and no remedy for the owner."' ,
One difficulty with such an argument is doctrinal. If the argument were
correct, then we would expect that the government would also not owe com-
pensation for private property that it commandeers and uses to address an
emergency, since "responsibility" for that acquisition and use would then be
attributed to the "necessity" rather than to the government. If the govern-
ment is not responsible for actions done out of "necessity," then its lack of
responsibility should be the same whether the act in question consists of use
or destruction. As we have already seen, however, the government has an
established obligation to pay compensation for such uses.
Moreover, this argument would equally imply that many ordinary tak-
ings have no just claim for compensation. If responsibility for the govern-
ment's destruction of a warehouse to create a firebreak lies not with the
government but with the fire, then it would seem equally plausible that the
responsibility for the government's occupying property to build a prison
would lie not with the government but with the need to incarcerate more
criminals, and similarly that the responsibility for the government's building
a freeway across formerly privately owned property would lie with the in-
crease in vehicular traffic. So if the lack of this sort of "responsibility" is
supposed to relieve the government of a responsibility to pay compensation,
the government would have no obligation to pay compensation for uses of
eminent domain for public projects such as prisons, roads, schools, hospi-
tals, and post offices. But of course those are paradigm instances of takings
that in fact do require compensation.
The argument's problems extend beyond concerns about doctrinal co-
herence. Assertions that the presence of necessity removes responsibility for
95. Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1880); cf United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S.
227, 234 (1887) ("For all injuries and destruction which followed necessarily from [military
operations during the Civil War] no compensation could be claimed from the government. By
the well settled doctrines of public law it was not responsible for them.").
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actions taken to address the necessity, and therefore the need to pay com-
pensation, effectively shift responsibility to the source of the necessity. This
in turn raises the question of who bears that responsibility.
In typical instances of emergency takings, the answer may seem simple:
responsibility lies with whoever or whatever created the dangerous threat,
such as an out-of-control fire or an invading army.96 The situation is more
complicated than this simple picture suggests, however, because the neces-
sity is not the result of a single factor, but rather of a confluence of three
factors: the presence of the threatening agent (such as a fire or invading
army), the presence of property that may augment or transmit that threat
(that is, the property demolished to address the emergency), and the pres-
ence of valuable property that may be harmed by receiving the effects of that
threat.9 7 The threatening phenomenon alone cannot bear all the responsibil-
ity for the necessity, because there would have been no need to destroy the
relevant property if the fire or invading army had been present but no one
else was nearby to protect. Hence, asserting that responsibility for the demo-
lition lies with the source of the "necessity" would not divert that responsi-
bility solely onto the threat. Instead, it would impose that responsibility
jointly on the threat and the community and the owner of the demolished
property.
Someone wedded to the noncompensation principle might reply that
this argument shows that no one (and nothing) is "responsible" for the
emergency demolition, not that everyone is. Such a reply would merely be
96. If the government in fact was responsible for creating the threat, for example, by
intentionally or negligently starting the fire that now threatens the property that the emer-
gency destruction seeks to protect, then the justification for denying compensation for the
effects of that destruction is especially weak. Susan Kuo has gone even further in the specific
context of natural disasters, arguing that because "[tlhe state's comprehensive responsibility
for disaster response extends beyond the immediate crisis," therefore "an evaluation of the
defense of public necessity should include the state's responsibility, if any, for the factors that
led to the crisis and the adequacy of its plans concerning tradeoffs that might become neces-
sary." Kuo, supra note 9, at 141.
97. These situations are in some ways similar to Ronald Coase's analysis of ordinary
nuisance cases: "We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature.... The real question
that has to be decided is: should [person] A be allowed to harm [person] B or should B be
allowed to harm A?" R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2 (1960).
Coase's analysis of nuisance is controversial. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 165 (1973) (arguing that even Coase's own discussion of nui-
sance examples does not treat them as purely reciprocal). However, the partial similarity be-
tween these two types of situation should not obscure an important difference. While Coasean
reciprocal causation may be controversial in the context of ordinary nuisance disputes, when
different uses occur in incompatibly close proximity-for example, a brickworks next to pri-
vate homes-in emergency-destruction cases the uses themselves, such as having a building on
a lot, are identical; what varies are the surrounding circumstances in which those uses occur.
For example, a fire that is approaching from one particular direction will reach some buildings
before others, making the first buildings a means for the fire to reach the others. If the fire
approaches from a different direction, the buildings that were potential conduits would
change, even without any change in their owners' behavior. Thus, analyzing emergency-de-
struction situations as involving mutual causal elements should be less controversial than in
the ordinary nuisance situations about which Coase and his critics disagree.
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an evasion, even if one refuses to attribute "responsibility" to natural phe-
nomena, because the government affirmatively chose to destroy the relevant
property. (The government could have let everything burn. Such a policy
would have been unwise, but not impossible.) Because there was a choice,
the only possible question is who or what bears the responsibility for that
choice, not whether anyone did.
This conclusion that the community bears some responsibility for the
"necessity" should not be startling. An inescapable fundamental reality of
firebreaks and other paradigms of emergency takings is that when the gov-
ernment decides to destroy private property to address an emergency, it acts
on behalf of the community to protect the interests that that community
had developed as a result of its own choices. Therefore, even if one grants
this argument's premise that the test for owing compensation is bearing re-
sponsibility for a loss, it would still follow that the community would owe at
least some compensation to the owner of the sacrificed property, although
perhaps not full compensation.
Moreover, if property owners were never responsible for destructive ac-
tions taken in self-defense to avoid losses from fire, on the grounds that the
fire (or other threat) is solely responsible for that destruction, then it would
follow that the owner of the property targeted for destruction would be
permitted to use self-help to stop the demolition of his property. Since the
responsibility for the demolition was attributed to the fire rather than to the
people who chose to undertake the demolition, stopping the demolition
would just be stopping damage caused by the fire. It is true that if the self-
help is successful in stopping the demolition, then many other properties
might burn, but responsibility for those losses, by hypothesis, would have to
be attributed to the fire rather than to the owner who exercised self-help.
Hence, this attempt to justify demolishing certain property without paying
compensation would equally justify intervention by the owner of that
targeted property to prevent the demolition.
A further concern about arguments based on shifting responsibility for
the destruction arises from the question of why the government has the
right to destroy the property at all. Presumably the answer derives from two
facts: first, that the well-being of many members of the public depends on
that destruction, and, second, that the state has an inherent duty to protect
certain aspects of its public's well-being, such as by limiting violent crime or
conflagrations. The "necessity" that compels the government's action in
conducting emergency destruction inherently depends on the existence of a
duty to protect those specific people over whom the government exercises
sovereignty, which of course includes the owner of the demolished property.
Hence, if one asserts that the responsibility for any loss of property as a
result of a fire, including property demolished to create a firebreak, lies with
the fire, it would follow that the government had failed to fulfill its duty to
protect the owner of the demolished property from fire.
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Ordinarily, the government may not be liable for its failure to act in
ways that duty arguably would have required.98 This particular failure, how-
ever, would not be the result of government inaction, but rather of an af-
firmative act of destruction-demolishing the building to address the
oncoming threat. Unless the destruction of that property was inevitable any-
way (that possibility shall be considered in a moment), the government's
action increased the probability of the property's destruction from a mere
possibility or likelihood to a certainty (that is, to 100 percent). Whatever else
a duty of protection against certain types of threat may require, actively
ensuring that the threat is in fact successful presumably violates that duty of
protection. And such a violation would naturally seem to justify a claim for
compensation. Hence, attempting to transfer responsibility for the destruc-
tion from the government to the threat merely alters the grounds on which
compensation could be demanded. It does not defeat such a demand.
2. A Special Case: Inevitable Destruction
A variant of this lack-of-responsibility argument arises in the special
case of a government action that destroys property that the calamity inevita-
bly would have destroyed anyway.99 Intuitively it makes sense that in such
circumstances the deliberate destruction gives the owner of the destroyed
property no legitimate claim for compensation. Dana and Merrill suggest
that this is because "[i]f the claimant's property would have been engulfed
by fire in any event, then the government's intervention should not be re-
garded as the cause [of] its demise."100
Although the conclusion of that argument is sound, the reasoning is not
quite right. The government clearly is the cause of the property's demise at
the particular time that it is destroyed. The question is what follows from
that causal relationship. 0 1 That the property's eventual destruction is inevi-
table does not make the government's action cease to be the cause of de-
struction now. Were it otherwise, the fact that someday the universe will
end, destroying everything on Earth, would entail that my smashing a vase
now is not the cause of that vase's destruction, since its eventual destruction
was inevitable. And the same would hold true of any other act ordinarily
thought of as destructive. Nevertheless, Dana and Merrill are correct that, as
98. For an argument that, under certain circumstances, the government in fact should be
liable for failures to act, see Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State's Affirmative Duty to
Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 377-84 (2014).
99. See, e.g., Taylor v. Plymouth, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 462 (1844) (holding that a statute
requiring compensation for property destroyed to create a firebreak should not be construed
to apply to the destruction of property that was already aflame and would inevitably have been
lost); Pentz v. Receivers of Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 9 Paige Ch. 568, 570 (N.Y. Ch. 1842) (noting
that New York City could not be assessed for its order to blow up homes during the Great Fire,
since the homes would have been destroyed anyway).
100. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 119.
101. For a prominent philosophical discussion of attributions of legal responsibility in
situations of causal overdetermination generally, see H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORS, CAUSA-
TION IN THE LAW 235-49 (2d ed. 1985).
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a practical matter, compensation is not owed in the sorts of situations that
they have in mind. The reason, however, springs not from the fact that the
property's eventual destruction was inevitable but rather from the fact that
the inevitable destruction was imminent. 102 The amount of compensation
that the owner of doomed property could justly claim is solely for the value
of the property during the time between the government's destruction of the
property and its inevitable demise.'0° Since that period would have been
both very short and quite unpleasant, that value lies somewhere between de
minimis and zero. So the government indeed does owe no compensation to
owners of demolished property in situations of inevitable destruction-not,
however, because the government is inherently not liable for such destruc-
tion, but rather because the amount of damages deserved on account of that
liability is zero.
3. The Property Owner Is Responsible for a "Nuisance"
A variant of the responsibility-shifting argument seeks to defend the
noncompensation principle by attributing responsibility for the threatening
condition-for example, the threat caused by a conflagration-to the owner
of the demolished property. The assertion is not that the owner started the
fire or otherwise created the dangerous condition, but that the owner never-
theless participates in the existence of that condition by maintaining prop-
erty that could transmit the threatening condition to neighboring
properties.
This argument commonly takes the form of analogies to the doctrine of
nuisance or, more generally, of invocations of the state's "police power." The
Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas provided a classic statement of this gen-
eral doctrine in the context of takings law:
The power which the states have of prohibiting such use by individuals of
their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety
of the public, is not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of
organized society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State
must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may
sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their
property, to inflict injury upon the community. The exercise of the police
power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or
the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes
depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from
102. Cf id. at 240 ("The notion of causing death is not as logically simple as might seem.
Since everyone dies, 'causing death' involves the notion of shortening .the span of life which
the victim might normally expect and not merely determining the manner of dying.
(footnote omitted)).
103. Cf Grant v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 551, 552 (1863) (Loring, J., dissenting) ("I think
the United States are to pay only for what they added to [the depreciation of the owner's
property], viz: the substitution of its burning for its abandonment, or the difference between
these to the petitioner."); HART & HONORt, supra note 101, at 240-41 (asserting that when
death is overdetermined, "the damages payable [by a negligent actor] would be minimal in
view of the fact that [the victim] was doomed").
[Vol. 114:391
Emergency Takings
depriving a person of his property without due process of law. In the one
case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other, unoffending property is taken
away from an innocent owner.
0 4
At first glance, application of this general principle to emergency-de-
struction situations might seem natural. For example, Dana and Merrill as-
sert that one possible explanation for the noncompensation principle in fire
cases "is based on an extension of the nuisance exception. Although an inert
building is ordinarily not a nuisance, when approached by a raging fire it
can be said to take on the characteristics of a tinder box, and thus poses a
nuisance-like' threat to other buildings."
10 5
Before considering the normative foundations of such a comparison, it
is worth noting that as a doctrinal matter, Dana and Merrill are correct to
treat this sort of argument as an "extension" of the nuisance exception. Or-
dinary nuisance doctrine in fact would not be likely to justify uncompen-
sated destruction in such circumstances, and it useful to pause a moment to
understand why that is. °06
There are two standard categories of nuisance-public and private-
and although they have certain important differences, they also have much
in common. One key element shared by both is the idea that property own-
ers may be liable for their "unreasonable" property-related activities that
cause harm, or pose a risk of harm, to other members of the community. In
the case of private nuisance, the concern is unreasonable interference with
other property owners' use and enjoyment of their own property. 10 7 In the
case of public nuisance, the concern is unreasonable interference with a pub-
lic right, such as a general right to health or safety. 08
104. 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887). In Mugler, the "noxious use" in question was the produc-
tion of alcoholic beverages. Id. at 623. A long line of cases have followed Mugler over the past
century. See e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) ("A law or decree
[that prohibits, without compensation, all economically beneficial use of land] must.., do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent land-
owners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by
the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or
otherwise."); cf Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20
(1987) ("[Slince no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or
otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin
the nuisance-like activity.").
105. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 119-20.
106. But see Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 73 (1853) ("A house on fire, or those in its
immediate vicinity, which serve to communicate the flames, becomes a nuisance, which it is
lawful to abate, and the private rights of the individual yield to the considerations of general
convenience, and the interests of society."). In Surocco, however, the court may have had in
mind only situations in which "it was perfectly evident that [the relevant] building must be
consumed [by the fire]," in other words, when destruction was inevitable. Id.
107. E.g., 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 9 (2015).
108. E.g., County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 76 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1996)
("The County must... establish that some offensive or obstructive condition interferes with a
right common to the general public [to claim public nuisance]."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 821B(l) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) ("A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public.").
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One central question that naturally arises in nuisance contexts-and
that is the focus of much nuisance law and commentary-is what sorts of
acts are in fact "unreasonable." The Restatement (Second) of Torts offers a
prominent, and controversial, example of a very broad, utilitarian concep-
tion of "unreasonable" activity. Among the "[c]ircumstances that may sus-
tain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable," the
Restatement authors include "[w]hether the conduct involves a significant
interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the
public comfort or the public convenience." 0 9 Moreover, the Restatement au-
thors assert, if the activity in question was intentional rather than accidental,
the activity will qualify as "unreasonable" if "the gravity of the harm out-
weighs the utility of the actor's conduct." 1 0 If the relevant conduct is unin-
tentional, then under the Restatement approach a private nuisance will arise
only if the activity was "otherwise actionable under the rules controlling
liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous con-
ditions or activities. " " '
In the context of takings law, such a broad understanding of nuisance, if
taken literally, invites a straightforward comparison between an abatable
nuisance and a building destroyed to create a firebreak, or a petroleum de-
pot destroyed to slow an invading army. Such destruction typically occurs
when the public safety is at stake, and when the social benefit of engaging in
such destruction clearly outweighs the destruction's social costs. Keeping the
building or factory intact in such circumstances might, at first glance, seem
clearly to qualify as an "unreasonable" interference with the property inter-
ests of others and therefore as either a public or a private nuisance." 2 And
since a basic principle of nuisance law is that those who commit nuisances
are not owed compensation for being required to cease their commission, a
justification for likewise denying compensation in emergency-destruction
cases would follow automatically." 3
It is unlikely, however, that emergency destruction would qualify as
abating a "nuisance" even under the broad Restatement understanding of
nuisance. It is scarcely plausible that a property owner's decision not to de-
molish a building is "intentional" if a conflagration or other sudden emer-
gency arises while the owner is away from the property, and therefore lacks
the ability to interact with the property or perhaps does not even know that
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2).
110. Id. § 826(a). This rule is supposed to apply to both private and public nuisances. Id.
§ 826(a) cmt. a.
111. Id. § 822(b).
112. In addition to positive actions, the failure to act when acting is required by law can
be a grounds for finding a public nuisance. See, e.g., People v. Wing, 81 P. 1104 (Cal. 1905)
(per curiam) (holding that maintenance of a building that was a fire hazard in violation of
municipal code would constitute a public nuisance).
113. See, e.g., Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71
IOWA L. REV. 775, 775-77 (1986) (acknowledging that only one nuisance case had ever re-
quired a prevailing plaintiff to compensate the defendant on whom the court had imposed an
injunction).
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an emergency exists. Moreover, merely maintaining a building on a lot that
one day turns out to be in the path of a fire or an invading army is neither
"negligent or reckless conduct" nor an "abnormally dangerous condition[ ]
or activit[y] ."114 So the "invasion" caused by the risk of the spread of fire or
aid to the enemy would not qualify as a nuisance under either the inten-
tional invasion prong of the Restatement test or under the "unintentional
and otherwise actionable" prong, or any plausible extension of that particu-
lar prong.
Moreover, there is a deep general difficulty with adopting a conception
of nuisance that is so broad as to encompass property destroyed to address
emergencies. If such a conception of nuisance is applied in the takings con-
text, then even ordinary exercises of eminent domain would be immune
from demands for compensation. If the government wishes to raze a tall
building on privately owned property, or fell trees on that property to clear
airspace for a new nearby airport, or occupy that property to construct a
new prison or fire station, the owner's refusal to allow that destruction or
use might create "a significant interference with . . .the public safety, the
public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience."' 5 Moreover,
the utility of the private owner's keeping those trees and buildings intact, or
excluding the government from his property may well not outweigh the so-
cial cost of those activities. Hence, according to this broad conception of
"nuisance," forcing the owner to cease those activities would merely be abat-
ing a nuisance, and the government would owe that owner no compensation
for the loss that he suffers as a result. However, those are quintessential
examples of situations in which the government would be expected to exer-
cise its power of eminent domain to take the land, and therefore to pay
compensation. This incompatibility with a basic constitutional principle of
eminent domain law renders this version of the nuisance analogy
implausible.l" 6
Because the source of the difficulty is that the analogy's criteria for what
constitutes a "nuisance" are simply too broad, the natural solution would be
to narrow those criteria. And in fact, that is what the law generally does. Not
every interference with "public convenience" constitutes an abatable nui-
sance, nor does every act or omission that fails to maximize overall social
utility. Instead, nuisance liability is ordinarily limited to activities that either
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(b).
115. Id. § 821B(2)(a).
116. Derek Muller has levied a similar criticism against the nuisance analogy. Muller,
supra note 9, at 510-11. Muller also criticizes the analogy on the grounds that "an actual
nuisance must exist before the state can control it; the potential for a nuisance is not enough,"
and the sorts of property destroyed in emergency destruction, such as "[a] house that has not
yet caught fire," are "not 'actual nuisances,' but potential nuisances or not nuisances at all." Id.
at 511. This second argument is doctrinally suspect. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 822 cmt. d ("An injunction may be obtained in a proper case against a threatened
private nuisance .... ); 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 36 (2015) ("[A]n anticipatory nuisance is gener-
ally a valid cause of action, but the anticipated nuisance must be proven so as to make any
argument that it is not a nuisance highly improbable.").
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are inherently wrongful or are unusual in the locality where they are con-
ducted. Letting buildings decay into disrepair or accumulating garbage that
can attract vermin and disease are examples of the former category of activ-
ity. 117 Conducting generally legitimate but exceptionally loud or noxious ac-
tivities in a quiet residential neighborhood is an example of the latter. As the
Supreme Court famously observed, "[a] nuisance may be merely a right
thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard.""' 8
These restrictions avoid the implausible implications noted above, since
ordinary exercises of eminent domain often involve taking property that is
well-maintained and completely harmonious with its neighborhood." 9
Thus, such exercises would no longer be miscategorized as instances of "nui-
sance" abatement. 120 But this shrinking of the universe of abatable nuisances
has the simultaneous effect of excluding the sorts of "activities" that emer-
gency destruction addresses. Consider, for example, the goods owners in the
Great New York Fire of 1835, or Caltex during the invasion of the Philip-
pines. Neither was out of place in its locality: the goods owners were storing
their perfectly ordinary goods in ordinary warehouses located in what was
then New York City's warehouse district. Indeed, the entire reason that a
firebreak was needed was that neighboring owners also had property that
might burn. Likewise, Caltex was operating an industrial facility in an area
suitable for industrial activity. It was a factory in a factory district, a pig in a
barnyard.
Nor were any of those parties in any way careless with their property or
inattentive to its maintenance. To the contrary, the very reason why the
Caltex facility needed to be destroyed was because it was in sufficiently good
operating condition to be useful to the invading army. None of these owners
had been violating any laws or regulations in the activities, nor had they
been doing anything different from anyone else in the area.
So if the analogy to nuisance is to work at all, the argument would have
to be that although the owners' actions-keeping their property intact-
were not wrongful in general, those actions became wrongful in the specific
117. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (providing a history of
common-law public nuisances); 13 AM. JUR. 2D Buildings § 53 (2015) (giving "noncompliance
of premises with building or sanitary regulations" as examples of public nuisances).
118. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
119. Even the designation of property as "blighted" does not automatically remove the
obligation to compensate for that property if the government takes it from its owner, because
"blight" designations are used to justify (often controversially) the exercise of eminent domain,
not to attempt to avoid paying compensation to the owners of the taken property. See, e.g.,
Martin E. Gold & Lynne B. Sagalyn, The Use and Abuse of Blight in Eminent Domain, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119 (2011).
120. Lee Anne Fennell's observation that "a nuisance-like rationale for the exercise of
eminent domain, such as 'blight,' is not generally thought to relieve governmental actors of the
requirement that just compensation be paid if land is taken away permanently," offers addi-
tional support for the implausibility of the broad conception of "nuisance" in this context.
Fennell, supra note 60, at 68.
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immediate context of the ongoing emergency-the uncontained conflagra-
tion or the invading army's inexorable advance on Manila. Even as a purely
doctrinal matter, however, such an argument faces difficulties. For example,
courts have held that a property owner cannot be found liable for nuisance
if the condition in question is solely the product of natural forces indepen-
dent of any culpable action by that owner.12' And in the ordinary instance of
emergency destruction, there is nothing special that the owners of the de-
molished property have done to make themselves culpable. For all anyone
knows, and for all the law cares, they have been exemplary owners.
Moreover, the suggestion that keeping one's property intact in an emer-
gency suddenly becomes wrongful loses any plausibility when one asks what
the normative justification would be for extending nuisance law in this way.
Nuisance law's complexities have famously been described as an "impenetra-
ble jungle," and there is no canonical simple account of nuisance law's nor-
mative foundations.' 22 One essential component of any such justification,
however, would clearly involve an attribution of responsibility to the owner
of the property that is abated as a nuisance. Owners of property have certain
social duties, and society, acting through the government, may require those
owners to refrain from breaching those duties in ways potentially detrimen-
tal to others. If owners are responsible for a breach, for example by failing
properly to maintain their property or by choosing to engage in activities
that it was reasonable to expect them to recognize were inappropriate for
that locality, then society is justified in making them bear the costs of their
breach. By contrast, a principal reason why justice imposes no obligation on
the property owners (or government) who complained about those activi-
ties-that is, the plaintiffs in a nuisance suit-to compensate the defendants
is because those plaintiffs themselves bear no responsibility for the conflict
in uses. Nuisance doctrine fairly clearly reflects this intuitive normative prin-
ciple, as is evident from the fact that when plaintiffs are responsible for the
conflict, such as by "coming to the nuisance," that fact will limit their ability
to prevail in their nuisance actions. 123
In emergency-destruction situations, then, the underlying intuition jus-
tifying noncompensation for the destruction would have to be that, just as
in nuisance cases, the owner of the property to be destroyed bears responsi-
bility for the threat to the public safety, while the owners of the properties to
be saved lack responsibility for that threat. But in the paradigmatic instances
121. See, e.g., Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist., 253 Cal. Rptr. 470, 474 (Ct. App.
1988) ("[W]here injury is allegedly caused by a natural condition, the imposition of liability
on a nuisance theory, as a practical matter, requires a finding that there was negligence in
dealing with it."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(b); 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 14
(collecting example cases). But see Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
122. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 616 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1988).
123. Cf. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Devel. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Ariz. 1972)
(en banc) (granting injunction against nuisance but requiring that the successful plaintiff pay
compensation to the defendant, because the plaintiffs actions were in part responsible for the
existence of the problem).
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of emergency destruction, that factual condition simply is not met. The
owners in lower Manhattan whose property was sacrificed to protect other
owners' property from fire were no more responsible for the conflagration
than the protected owners were. Likewise, Caltex was no more culpable for
the Japanese invasion of the Philippines than any other American was.12 4
Moreover, the implausibility of deeming an activity a nuisance is especially
high when the activity is as mundane as possessing an ordinary building. As
one court noted in the nuisance context, "[ciommon sense dictates that the
quite ordinary activity of growing trees on one's land is, without more, pre-
sumptively reasonable." 21
Attempting to draw an analogy between emergency destruction and
nuisance abatement raises one other peculiarity. In general, maintaining a
public nuisance on one's property is a wrong act, both legally and mor-
ally. 2 6 So in emergency-destruction situations, if keeping the building stand-
ing is akin to "public nuisance," then it would follow that if a large fire
approached property that could serve as a firebreak by being destroyed, the
owner of that property would be morally and perhaps legally obligated to
demolish it herself. Indeed, in at least some jurisdictions the owner of prop-
erty deemed to be a public nuisance is liable for the costs of the govern-
ment's razing that nuisance. 127 In the emergency-destruction context, there
is little intuitive plausibility to the idea that if the relevant owners do not
themselves destroy their own property, knowing that they will be refused
compensation for their losses, they have somehow acted wrongly. Nor is it
plausible to assert that the owners of property destroyed by the government
actually owe the government money, to reimburse it for its expenses in de-
molishing the property that the private owners should have destroyed
themselves.
Likewise, the law itself does not make such a self-protective owner liable
for damages to everyone whose property burned but might not have if the
owner had destroyed her own property, and it is hard to see how justice
would demand such liability. Indeed, if it were otherwise, anyone who failed
to demolish his own house when doing so could have served as a firebreak
would be liable to everyone "downstream" whose houses burned as a result,
which would amount to imposing liability on everyone except the owner of
the last house to burn. So (almost) everyone would be a "wrongdoer" on
this view, which seems wholly implausible as a characterization of disasters.
Conflagrations create masses of victims, not masses of delinquents who have
failed to act with enough solicitude of others to destroy their own buildings.
124. As a purely doctrinal matter, the mere fact that more than one owner is engaged in
some activity does not immunize that activity from being deemed a nuisance. However, if the
plaintiff himself is also engaged in that same activity, that may affect the availability of a
nuisance judgment. See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 22.
125. County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 76 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1996) (footnote
omitted).
126. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. a (discussing the remedies
available for public nuisances).
127. 13 AM. JUR. 2D Buildings § 52 (2015).
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So, in the end, in spite of any superficial initial plausibility, attempting
to "extend" nuisance doctrine to justify refusing to compensate owners of
property destroyed to address emergencies is unconvincing.
C. Compensation Is Superfluous
A third set of arguments contends that the government should not be
required to pay compensation because it would be superfluous. One version
of this argument asserts that the owner of the destroyed property in fact has
already received "in-kind" compensation for her loss and therefore has no
just claim to receive monetary compensation as well. A second version sug-
gests that there is no need for the government to mitigate the losses suffered
from emergency destruction because private insurance could protect prop-
erty owners just as well, and perhaps more efficiently. And a third argument
asserts that the compensation requirement's general purpose in ordinary
takings situations is to prevent socially inefficient opportunistic behavior,
but that the risk of such opportunism is low in emergency-destruction situa-
tions, and therefore a compensation requirement is unnecessary. Each of
these arguments can be examined separately, and their inadequacy will soon
be evident.
1. Implicit Ex Ante Compensation
One defense of the noncompensation principle asserts that monetary
compensation for emergency destruction is unnecessary because the owners
of the demolished property have already received compensation in a non-
monetary form. For example, Dana and Merrill suggest that
[t]he practice of allowing the government to destroy buildings in the path
of fire significantly reduces the total amount of destruction caused by cata-
strophic fires. All owners thus receive implicit compensation in the form of
reduced insurance rates for giving up the right to ex post compensation. 2 ,
This sort of argument is one type of a common general invocation of
"in-kind compensation" or "reciprocal advantage" to justify burdensome
government actions that provide no monetary compensation to the people
on whom the burdens fall, even though justice would appear to require
compensation.Y9 The typical suggestion is that the presence of "in-kind
compensation" makes up for the lack of monetary compensation, ensuring
128. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 119. Lior Strahilevitz argued for a similar conclu-
sion in a case in which police damaged rental property while apprehending a suspected drug
dealer. See Strahilevitz, supra note 35, at 1975, 1977-78 (arguing that the landlord was entitled
to zero compensation because the economic value of not having a drug dealer nearby-value
that the landlord could capture by charging higher rents-compensated the landlord for the
$718 loss).
129. The same basic concept goes under a variety of names. Justice Holmes famously
referred to it as "average reciprocity of advantage" in Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). Justice Brandeis's dissent in that case adopted similar language, referring to "reciprocal
advantage." Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J. dissenting). Some prominent modern commentators use
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that the affected parties have been made whole and thus have no just claim
for further compensation. 0 Space does not permit consideration here of the
general plausibility of appeals to in-kind compensation. This Section argues,
however, that such appeals lack plausibility in the specific context of emer-
gency destruction.
Dana and Merrill's formulation of the argument can serve as a starting
point for understanding the problem. The first thing to notice is that the
suggestion that owners "receive implicit compensation in the form of re-
duced insurance rates for giving up the right to ex post compensation" can-
not be quite right. The problem lies in the failure to distinguish between the
two separate questions of whether the destruction of property in an emer-
gency is permissible even without the owner's permission and whether the
owner of such property is entitled to compensation for the loss inflicted by
that destruction. (This distinction will be familiar from Part II's discussion
of the difference between destruction necessity and noncompensation neces-
sity.) As Dana and Merrill note, an affirmative answer to the first question-
that is, an assertion that emergency destruction is permissible-tends to re-
duce the total amount of destruction caused by a large fire.' 3' That decrease
in turn tends to decrease the number and size of claims that fire insurance
companies may be obligated to pay, and consequently tends to decrease the
premiums that owners must pay to purchase such insurance.
But the source of this benefit is the ability to destroy property to create a
firebreak. Removal of combustible material is what minimizes the destruc-
tiveness of fires. By contrast, relinquishing a "right to ex post compensation"
has no effect on fires' harmfulness, and therefore provides no benefits to the
owner of the destroyed property. Presumably what Dana and Merrill really
had in mind, therefore, was a different argument: because the policy of al-
lowing emergency destruction reduces the total destructiveness of fires, and
thus insurance premiums, the owner of property demolished in such emer-
gencies has already received in-kind compensation in the form of lower in-
surance premiums, and therefore is not owed separate monetary
compensation specifically for the loss of the demolished property.
This argument rests on certain assumptions that may not be true in
practice. One key assumption is that the owner of the demolished property
has been paying for insurance against the relevant sort of loss. In the case of
the term "in-kind compensation." See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 195 (1985) ("im-
plicit in-kind compensation"); Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, supra note 76, at 987
("in-kind compensation").
130. General works on "in-kind compensation" include Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity
of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U.
L. REV. 297 (1990); Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity
of Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449 (1997). For a
general critique of suggestions that in-kind compensation can reliably make owners "whole"
when other forms of compensation are lacking, see Brian Angelo Lee, Average Reciprocity of
Advantage, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 99 (James Penner & Henry E.
Smith eds., 2013).
131. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 6, at 119.
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fire, that might commonly be true. The very poor, however, may not be able
to afford fire insurance, in which case they would have received no benefit at
all. Moreover, other forms of emergency destruction, such as wartime de-
struction, may involve catastrophes for which no insurance is available.
It will not help to suggest that even uninsured burdened parties received
a compensating benefit from the general effect of decreasing the risk of los-
ing one's property in a fire. Whatever plausibility such arguments might
have in other contexts, in the context of emergency destruction they are
quite paradoxical. It is difficult to see how someone whose property has
been destroyed to protect other people's property has been made whole by
the possibility that other people's property might have been destroyed to
save his. Such an assertion would amount to the seemingly paradoxical claim
that losing one's property is the price that one must be willing to pay to
reduce the chances of losing one's property.
Even if one were to set aside those concerns, however, and stipulate that
all of the relevant parties are insured, the argument still would not be con-
vincing. As a general matter, it is hard to evaluate an argument of this sort
unless it is accompanied by some empirical analysis showing that the size of
the benefit received in fact does match or exceed the size of the loss-that is,
in this case showing that the owner of the demolished property was in fact
made whole by the lower insurance rates that the availability of emergency
destruction made possible. Given the uncertainty that characterizes much of
life, that calculation may often be difficult or impossible to make. In prac-
tice, such calculations are conspicuously absent from invocations of in-kind
compensation. Consequently, assertions that in-kind compensation in fact
makes owners of demolished property whole must be taken on faith, with-
out any reason offered for embracing such a faith.
Moreover, this particular article of faith seems unlikely to be true. The
point of insurance is to spread the costs of low probability but severe losses
among a pool of people who agree to insure each other.' Thus, the total
amount that an insured party pays in premiums should ordinarily be signifi-
candy less than the amount of the party's claim for insurance benefits if a
loss actually does occur. 133 The very reason that insurance is attractive is the
expectation that the sum of the premiums paid will be less than the amount
of the covered loss if a loss occurs. Thus, there is no possible reduction in
premiums that would equal the size of the loss that was actually experienced
if a loss occurs.
But even if the magnitude of the loss and the magnitude of the in-kind
benefit somehow happened to match, another basic problem remains. Al-
though everyone shares the benefit of a reduction in insurance premiums,
the cost of the destruction that enabled that reduction is imposed on the
demolished property's owner alone. Thus, that owner's net result is worse
132. See 1 JEFFREY E. THOMAS, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION
§ 1.01 (2015).
133. See Allan H. Willett, Function of Fire Insurance, in FIRE INSURANCE 41, 41-44 (Lester
W. Zartman ed., 1909).
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than everyone else's. This is a familiar issue in takings law in general. 13 4 As a
result, takings doctrine has developed a standard solution: when an entire
parcel is taken through eminent domain, compensation is paid for the fair
market value of the parcel, and when only part of a parcel is taken, the
amount of compensation paid to the parcel's owner is reduced to account
only for any increase in value that the remaining portion specially enjoys as a
result of the project. 135 It is not reduced to account for increases in value that
are widely shared. 36 The underlying rationale is simple and intuitively plau-
sible: to the extent that the government's confiscation has made the bur-
dened owner worse off than everyone else, the government is obligated to
remedy the inequality by paying compensation for the imposed loss.11
That some act of destruction occurs as the result of an emergency pro-
vides no obvious reason to abandon this basic principle. Hence, the presence
of widely shared benefits in the form of lower insurance rates does not jus-
tify refusing to compensate those who were compelled to suffer the losses
that produce those benefits. Indeed, effectively penalizing a party for being
compelled to provide a benefit to others seems perverse.
2. Private Insurance as Substitute for Public Compensation
A related argument in favor of the noncompensation principle suggests
that requiring the government to pay compensation is unnecessary because
private insurance could protect property owners just as well, and perhaps
more efficiently. This argument's basic premise-the idea that government
compensation for takings might be considered a form of insurance-is not a
recent invention. In an 1840 opinion addressing a claim arising out of the
Great New York Fire of 1835, Gulian Crommelin Verplanck suggested that a
New York statute providing compensation to owners of buildings destroyed
to create firebreaks could be justified as akin to a mandatory insurance pol-
icy administered by the government:
As it is a calamity to which all parts of the city may at different times be
subject, the whole city may fairly be made liable by law to contribute
whenever it occurs. It is so far a sort of mutual insurance, and all property
is held subject to that agreement and responsibility, with all the contingent
future benefits of it as well as the burden. 138
134. For one statement of the issue in the standard takings context, see James E. Krier &
Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 866.
135. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 338 (2015).
136. Id.
137. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 19-20, 22-23 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting the connection between regulatory-takings requirements
and ensuring that owners burdened by regulations are not "singled out unfairly," and applying
that principle to a rent-control ordinance); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests,
77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1344-45 (1991) (noting compensation requirements to avoid "singl[ing]
out").
138. Stone v. Mayor of New York, 25 Wend. 157, 176-77 (N.Y. 1840) (opinion of Ver-
planck, Sen.).
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It is then perhaps not surprising that some modern commentators have
suggested that private insurance could, and arguably should, replace govern-
ment-paid compensation for any form of taking, including eminent domain.
For example, Steven Shavell has argued that because any compensation paid
by the government would be funded through taxation, owners who receive
the compensation would be no better off than if they had purchased private
insurance:
[T]hrough payment of higher taxes to finance compensation for takings,
individuals must implicitly pay exactly the premium they would be charged
for private insurance coverage against takings. Thus, given the existence of
well-functioning insurance markets, the social need for risk-averse individ-
uals to be compensated against loss does not imply that the state should
pay compensation if it takes property; a regime in which private parties
purchase insurance coverage would be essentially the same as one of state
payment of compensation. 13 9
This argument rests on an empirical assumption about the presence of
"well-functioning insurance markets" for coverage against government de-
struction of property. 140 That assumption is controversial.'14
An additional complication is that a private insurance policy is only as
good as the solvency of the firm that issued it, and widespread calamities
may cause insurance companies to fail. For example, in the aftermath of the
Great New York Fire of 1835, all but two or three insurance companies went
bankrupt. (Accounts differ on the exact number.)142 Today reinsurance prov-
iders may mitigate that danger, but even large reinsurance companies cannot
necessarily be assumed to remain solvent in a crisis. 143 Also worth noting is
that the cases that have shaped the emergency destruction doctrine over the
centuries are ones in which insurance seems not to have been available, since
139. SHAVELL, supra note 53, at 128; see also Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 602-06 (1986) (discussing the extent to which Kaplow's
basic criticism of governmental compensation for legal transitions applies to the specific case
of takings).
140. In the case of private fire insurance, some jurisdictions have routinely interpreted
fire-insurance contracts in a way that effectively requires fire-insurance companies to cover
losses caused by the creation of firebreaks. See, e.g., 13 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAE-
DIA OF LAW 131 (David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., Northport, Edward Thompson
Co. 2d ed. 1899); Hall & Wigmore, supra note 9, at 506-07.
141. Compare SHAVELL, supra note 53, at 128 & n.27 (responding to arguments that mar-
kets cannot be relied on to provide the necessary insurance coverage), with DANA & MERRILL,
supra note 6, at 41 n.64 (arguing that "[s]ome confirmation of the market failure hypothesis is
provided by the market for insurance against expropriation of foreign investments").
142. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 17, at 476. At least one of the firms that avoided bank-
ruptcy did so merely because it had issued very little coverage in the burnt area. HENRY R.
GALL & WILLIAM GEORGE JORDAN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF FIRE INSURANCE 75 (1919).
143. See, e.g., J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, Systemic Risk and Regulation of the U.S.
Insurance Industry, in MODERNIZING INSURANCE REGULATION 85 (John H. Biggs & Matthew P.
Richardson eds., 2014) (discussing the systemic risk of a "retrocession spiral" in reinsurance
markets).
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the plaintiffs were individuals or directly affected businesses, rather than in-
surance companies seeking indemnification. 144 This fact does not prove that
a robust supply of such private insurance could not arise today, but it does
suggest that obstacles to the creation of such insurance markets are not
purely hypothetical.
Even on the assumption that such insurance would be readily available,
any initial plausibility that this argument might have vanishes as soon as one
looks beyond simple considerations of total social efficiency and begins to
consider the argument's distributional consequences. Two major problems
arise immediately. Although these two problems are not the only significant
difficulties that this argument faces, they are sufficient for present
purposes. 45
First is the problem of how the funds to pay the compensation are
raised. Even if the total amount raised through taxation (if the government
pays compensation) would be the same as the amount raised through insur-
ance premiums (if compensation is left to private insurance), the distribu-
tion of that fiscal burden across individuals may be quite different. Taxation
in theory, and often in practice, can be "progressive," in the sense that the
marginal tax rate may increase as the amount of the taxed item (for exam-
ple, income) grows larger.146 The effect is to impose average tax rates that are
higher on the rich than on the poor. By contrast, insurance premiums are
determined by applying a flat rate to the value of the insured property, with
no regard to the insurance purchaser's ability to pay. Thus, for example, an
insurance company might charge $1 to insure against $100 of loss, no matter
how wealthy the owner of the insured property is, while the government
might charge rich people more than $1 and poor people less than $1 to fund
$100 of compensation. To the extent that one thinks that the costs of gov-
ernment-provided social benefits in general should be borne on a "progres-
sive" basis, there is no obvious reason to abandon that general principle
when the particular benefit is the safety provided by emergency destruction.
Moreover, even if one favors a "flat" taxation system rather than a "pro-
gressive" system, one might nevertheless believe that there should be a level
of wealth or income below which a poor citizen should not owe taxes. The
current U.S. income-taxation system reflects that concern by having exemp-
tions and deductions that effectively shield certain people from any income-
tax liability. 47 The approach makes sense because the very poor may have so
little money that necessary expenses consume it all and they simply cannot
144. See infra Part IV.
145. Space does not permit a comprehensive consideration of proposals to substitute pri-
vate insurance for government compensation, important though that topic is.
146. E.g., 1 BoRIs I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, Es-
TATES AND GIFTS ! 3.5.3 (3d ed. Supp. No. 1 2015).
147. See, e.g., Robertson Williams, Who Pays No Federal Income Tax? A 2013 Update, TAx
NOTES, Sept. 30, 2013, at 1615.
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afford to lose any of it in taxes. 4s For the same reason, impoverished indi-
viduals who are barely getting by could not afford the additional expense of
purchasing insurance against the government's destroying their property.
The practical result of substituting private insurance for government com-
pensation therefore would be to leave an entire group of property owners
uncompensated for the losses imposed on them by the government, and,
even worse, that group would disproportionately be made up of those who
have the least resources to bear that loss.'49
A second problem compounds this distributional inequity. For an in-
surance fund to remain solvent, it must take in enough money in premiums
to cover the expected value of the benefits that it will have to pay. 50 As a
result, the price of insurance for a given item is ordinarily based on two
factors-the item's value and the likelihood that the item will suffer a loss. 5 '
As the value of the property increases, the cost of insurance increases, be-
cause in the event of a loss the insurance fund will have to cover a larger
benefit. Likewise, as the risk of loss increases, insurance premiums increase
because the likelihood that the insurance fund will have to cover a loss
increases.
This fundamental structure of private insurance means that the pre-
mium charged to a purchaser of insurance against government destruction
of a particular piece of property would increase as the risk of that destruc-
tion increased. That risk is not distributed equally or purely at random. Be-
cause the "necessity exception" applies only to the destruction of relatively
less valuable property, done to protect relatively more valuable property, the
risk of destruction is inherently greater for low-value property than it is for
high-value property. s2 Moreover, from a public choice perspective, one may
suspect that political pressure will lead to poor people's property being sac-
rificed more often than rich people's property. Politicians are unlikely to
order the destruction of a row of mansions to save a few blocks of nonde-
script poor laborers' homes. Therefore, for each dollar of insurance coverage
purchased, the price of that coverage for low-value property would be higher
148. In economic terms, the marginal value of an extra dollar to a very poor person is
very high, while the marginal value of an extra dollar to a very wealthy person is much less.
See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 53, at 648. Granting the former a zero marginal tax rate while
imposing a higher marginal tax rate on the latter therefore can maximize the social welfare
achieved at a given level of tax revenue.
149. One way to address that problem would be for the government to subsidize
purchases of private insurance. That approach, however, really just amounts to the govern-
ment's paying compensation. All that changes is the mechanism by which that compensation
is delivered.
150. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 93, at 48 ("Insurance companies attempt to set
their premiums so that, roughly, the premium modestly exceeds the expected monetary value
of the loss.").
151. For a basic description of mathematical expectation, see id. at 43--44.
152. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 cmt. d (AM LAW INST. 1965) (as-
serting, in the context of private necessity, that the exception applies "only where the property
sought to be saved is of considerably greater value than the amount of probable harm to the
possessor's land or chattels").
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than the price of that coverage for high-value property. (The total price of
the insurance coverage of course would likely be higher for highly valuable
property than for less valuable property, because the total amount of cover-
age is higher, but the rate at which each dollar of insurance was charged
would be greater for the low-value property.) Since it is likely that low-value
property will tend to be owned by poorer people, while high-value property
will tend to be owned by richer people, the ultimate effect would be to fi-
nance compensation by charging poor people at a higher rate than rich peo-
ple. Thus a system of private insurance against losses from emergency
takings would rest on a revenue-raising system that not only would lack
progressivity, but would actually be regressive.
In sum, even if private insurance for losses imposed by the government
as a result of emergency destruction is reliably available, which itself might
be unlikely, a requirement that property owners purchase such insurance
rather than receive compensation from the government lacks plausibility in
light of established beliefs about the appropriate distribution of burdens im-
posed to provide social benefits.
3. Little Risk of Opportunism
An alternative justification for the noncompensation principle is that
compensation is unnecessary because in emergency-destruction situations
there naturally is little risk of opportunistic behavior by small but politically
influential groups pursuing their own interests. This argument rests on an
assumption that in ordinary cases the purpose of takings compensation is to
diminish "rent-seeking" behavior by individuals or small groups who might
be expected to seek to harness the state's coercive power for their own per-
sonal benefit at the expense of the public good.5 3 This danger is potentially
acute in ordinary eminent-domain circumstances, in which the government
might coercively take property from some private owners to give it to other
private owners, thereby relieving the latter of the difficulty and expense of
paying a purchase price to which the former would voluntarily agree. Promi-
nent recent controversies surrounding redevelopment projects in Connecti-
cut and New York testify to the political potency of concerns that powerful
and wealthy private entities can co-opt the state's eminent-domain power to
increase their own private benefits. 5 4 Because a requirement to compensate
153. There is no single canonical definition of "rent seeking" or "opportunism" in this
context. One prominent definition of "opportunism" is Oliver Williamson's: "self-interest
seeking with guile." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47
(1985). Saul Levmore defines "rent seeking" more broadly: "resource-consuming activity un-
dertaken to gain a profit or government-sponsored advantage." Saul Levmore, Interest Groups
and the Problem with Incrementalism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 815, 818 (2010). For an example of
judicial notice of this general phenomenon, see Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 769
(1948) ("In this country, every war we have engaged in has provided opportunities for profi-
teering and they have been too often scandalously seized." (quoting United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 309 (1942))).
154. See, e.g., George F. Will, Opinion, In N.Y., Government's Eminent Arrogance, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2010, at A17 (criticizing the use of eminent domain for the Atlantic Yards project
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owners of taken property sharply decreases the potential private gains availa-
ble by co-opting the government's taking power, a compensation require-
ment might be expected to discourage such attempts and thus lead to a
more socially fruitful allocation of resources. 55
A simple argument in favor of the noncompensation principle results
from combining this assumption about the purpose of takings compensa-
tion with a second assumption that private entities commonly stand to gain
much less from the government's destruction of others' property than they
would from the government's confiscating that property and transferring its
ownership to them. Because there is much less incentive for opportunistic
behavior with respect to emergency destruction than there is with respect to
ordinary takings, there consequently is no need to require compensation
when the government engages in such destruction.1 s6
This argument faces several serious difficulties. First, as a matter of ex-
isting law and policy, the argument is difficult to reconcile with the well-
established requirement that the government pay compensation to owners
of property that the government destroys under ordinary circumstances.'5 7 If
the purpose of takings compensation really were merely to avoid opportu-
nism, and if the risk of opportunism really is low when the government
destroys property, then one would expect there to be no compensation re-
quirement for any instance of government destruction, whether it occurred
in ordinary circumstances or in an emergency. Hence, the law's treating
these two sorts of destruction differently remains puzzling on this account.
Likewise, if the argument's assumptions were correct, one would expect
that compensation would be a focal point of disagreement in public contro-
versies over projects in which opportunism was suspected to play a role. In
the prominent examples noted earlier, however, the public debate and the
relevant litigation revolved not around whether the owners of taken prop-
erty should receive compensation, but rather around whether the taking
in Brooklyn); Jeff Jacoby, Opinion, Eminent Disaster, Bos. GLOBE (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www
.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/03/12/the-devastation-caused-eminent-domain-abuseyWsyO
MNEZ91TM94PYQIhOL/story.html (criticizing the use of eminent domain for the economic
development project that prompted the takings dispute in Kelo v. New London); Jillian Kuma-
gai, Columbia Controversies: Eminent Domain in Manhattanville, December 2008, COLUM.
SPECTATOR (Aug. 26, 2012), http://columbiaspectator.com/news/2012/08/26/columbia-contro
versies-eminent-domain-manhattanville-december-2008 (discussing the controversy over the
use of eminent domain for Columbia University's expansion in New York's Manhattanville
neighborhood).
155. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 53, at 129-30; cf Merrill, supra note 76, at 87
("[Elminent domain is considerably less attractive as a target for rent seeking than, for exam-
ple, a government grant or a tax abatement, neither of which requires [compensation or pay-
ing the implementation costs of condemnation].").
156. Thanks to workshop participants for calling attention to this argument. For a version
of this argument focusing on the danger of the government's acting to "enrich itself," see
Cohen, supra note 35, at 24. For a judicial opinion relying on the role of government choice as
grounds for distinguishing emergency destruction from ordinary takings, see Walker v. United
States, 34 Ct. Cl. 345, 347 (1899).
157. See sources cited supra note 2.
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should be allowed at all. 5 ' The fact that the owners would receive compen-
sation was tangential to the issues actually raised. (In doctrinal terms, the
legal disputes focused on whether the relevant projects qualified as "public
uses," rather than on whether they involved "just compensation.") 59
Second, it is far from clear that the risk of opportunistic behavior in
emergency-destruction cases would in fact be low in the absence of any re-
quirement to pay compensation. 60 Although the arrival of emergencies is
typically outside anyone's control, emergency destruction, by nature, occurs
only when stakes are high. That fact introduces the possibility that those
whose wealth would be threatened by continued progress of the danger
would be highly motivated to attempt to influence officials to destroy prop-
erty as a bulwark against that progress even when the risks of catastrophe
were still relatively low and disinterested prudence might ordinarily counsel
waiting to see how circumstances develop. 161 This concern becomes even
greater when the public officials themselves have a stake in the outcome
because they own property in the threatened area or own investments that
might otherwise be affected.162 The limited information available about his-
torical examples ultimately does not permit estimating the size of the risk of
opportunism in emergency-destruction situations. If, however, one does
subscribe to the view that a compensation requirement's purpose is to dis-
courage opportunism, one cannot assume that the relevance of such a re-
quirement would vanish in emergencies.
158. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (concerning the New London,
Connecticut project); Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010) (con-
cerning the Manhattanville project); Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164
(N.Y. 2009) (concerning the Atlantic Yards project).
159. Cf COOTER & ULEN, supra note 93, at 176 (arguing that the fair-market value com-
pensation requirement will not prevent opportunistic confiscations and that the solution to
this problem is the public-use requirement); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and just
Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 131 (1992) (arguing that the compensation
requirement is unlikely to be effective at deterring rent-seeking, and therefore should not be
understood as aiming at that goal); Levmore, supra note 153, at 851-52 (acknowledging that
"uncompensated takings surely generate rent-seeking behavior," while also arguing that paying
compensation might have a similar effect).
160. Cf William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 872 (1995) (arguing that, in light of "process
failure" justifications of the Takings Clause, that clause is best understood as requiring com-
pensation when "a governmental action affects only the property interests of an individual or a
small group of people and when, in the absence of compensation, there would be a lack of
horizontal equity (that is, when compensation is the norm in similar circumstances)").
161. See HAMILTON, supra note 91, at 285 (mentioning his having lobbied public officials
to order destruction of warehouses during the Great New York Fire of 1835); cf. Kuo, supra
note 9, at 130 ("[Rlequiring the state to compensate individuals for economic loss would
provide some assurance that disaster tradeoffs were meant to maximize aggregate welfare and
not to protect powerful constituencies.").
162. This concern is not purely hypothetical. In the Great New York Fire of 1835, New
York's mayor was far from a disinterested decisionmaker. See EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE
WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEw YORK CITY TO 1898, at 595 (1999) ("Sam Ruggles was
deeply concerned-doubly so because he, like many large property owners, including Mayor
Cornelius Lawrence, held substantial shares in fire insurance companies.").
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A more fundamental difficulty with this argument is a general one
shared by any argument that focuses exclusively on extrinsic justifications
for requiring compensation in ordinary circumstances. Even if decreasing
potential returns to opportunistic maneuvering plays some role in motivat-
ing compensation requirements, aiming at such a decrease could not be the
sole consideration. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the
fairness aspect of takings compensation, routinely invoking Justice Hugo
Black's famous words in Armstrong v. United States, "[t]he Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use
without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."'
163
Reducing occasions for opportunism may promote fairness but is hardly
sufficient to ensure fairness. It is difficult to imagine that any property
owner who has suffered an uncompensated loss when the government took
her property would find much consolation in reliable assurances that oppor-
tunism played no role in the confiscation of that property, nor in assurances
that the taking did promote overall social efficiency. The fact that the public
genuinely benefited from the destruction of one's property is no substitute
for having an intact roof under which to take shelter when rain comes.
This problem arises even if one adopts a narrow, purely consequentialist
idea of "fairness." Frank Michelman famously noted that utilitarian analyses
of takings law need to take account of the psychological effects of govern-
ment policies, specifically their potential "demoralization costs."' 64 In the
context of emergency takings, establishing merely that there was a low risk
that opportunism influenced a government's decision to destroy property is
insufficient to show that society can dispense with paying compensation for
that property, because the uncompensated loss (as well as the risk of such
losses) might create significant demoralization among owners who have suf-
fered such losses or fear that they might. Moreover, a feeling of being ex-
ploited might intensify demoralization costs if the unlucky owners see that
others are benefiting from the imposition of those losses. Whether those
costs in any given case of emergency destruction would be large enough to
outweigh the social benefits of not paying compensation-most likely bene-
fits in the form of lower costs of administration-is an empirical question
that cannot be resolved here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to recog-
nize that this open question exists, and therefore even on assumptions
favorable to the opportunism argument, that argument is insufficient by it-
self to justify the noncompensation principle.
163. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle,
the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 1151, 1153-54
(1997) (noting that Black's language has "received a remarkable degree of assent across the
spectrum of opinion"). For later invocations of the principle, see, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
123 (1978).
164. Michelman, supra note 67, at 1214-15.
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D. Alternative Sources of Authority
A final set of defenses of the noncompensation principle asserts that the
government's destruction of property in an emergency is not an exercise of
the government's power of eminent domain but rather some other power,
one that carries no obligation to compensate the destroyed property's own-
ers. The two most prominent versions of these theories assert either that the
government was merely doing what a private individual had a right to do
without paying compensation, or that-in the case of wartime destruc-
tion-the government was exercising a war-making power that does not re-
quire compensation. As will soon be evident, both sets of arguments are
unpersuasive.
1. "Natural" Private Rights of Destruction
One version of this argument asserts that the government owes no com-
pensation for acts such as destroying a building to create a firebreak, because
the government's performance of those acts merely replicates what private
individuals, at common law, may themselves do without owing compensa-
tion. 65 For example, in Russell v. Mayor of New York, a case arising out of the
Great New York Fire of 1835, the highest court in New York asserted that
the assumption of the plaintiff, that this was a case of the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, will prove a fallacy. ... The destruction of this
property was authorized by the law of overruling necessity; it was the exer-
cise of a natural right belonging to every individual, not conferred by law,
but tacitly excepted from all human codes.'
66
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts asserts that "[t]he privilege to
avert a public disaster" by means of conducting emergency destruction "is
given to the actor in his capacity as a private person" and thus applies to
government officials even when statutory authority is lacking.167 This privi-
lege, the Restatement further asserts, immunizes the public official from lia-
bility for. the destruction, unless that destruction was unreasonable. 168
165. See Mayor of New York v. Lord, 17 Wend. 285 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 18 Wend. 126
(N.Y. 1837) ("No doubt, at common law, any person, in case of actual necessity to prevent the
spreading of a fire, might prostrate a building in a block or street, without being responsible in
trespass or otherwise. No legal redress existed for the injury though the sufferer might have
been thereby ruined."). The mention of "legal redress" leaves open the possibility that some
equitable remedy might still have been available. See Stone v. Mayor of New York, 25 Wend.
157, 174-75 (N.Y. 1840) (opinion of Verplanck, Sen.) (suggesting that the owner of property
destroyed to create a firebreak might have "an equitable right of compensation against those
who have benefited by his loss in the preservation of their property").
166. 2 Denio 461, 473-74 (N.Y. 1845) (opinion of Sherman, Sen.). For other examples,
see Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 73 (1853); Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 714, 729 (N.J. 1848)
(opinion of Nevius, J.).
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmts. c & f (Am. LAW. INST. 1965).
168. See id. § 196 cmt. b.
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This argument obviously will not apply to destruction of property in the
course of military operations, which are quintessentially not private actions.
Moreover, whatever plausibility this argument had in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the development of twentieth-century law has undermined its doctri-
nal foundations. 69 As even the Restatement acknowledges, private necessity
today does not automatically exempt the private individual who inflicts
damage out of necessity from a requirement to pay compensation for that
damage. 170
More important, however, is the argument's lack of general plausibility.
Intuitively, it is far-fetched to assert that an act by a public official, on duty,
to promote the public welfare is in fact a "private" act. Although typically no
attempt is made to justify that assertion, a few courts and commentators
have suggested that emergency destruction was not a "public" act because
the act's beneficiaries were only the subset of the public that had been
threatened by the harmful condition, rather than the entire public.' 7' This
argument relies on an implausibly stringent definition of the "public" good,
a definition that would classify even paradigm instances of ordinary eminent
domain as not for a "public" use, and therefore unconstitutional. For exam-
ple, if the government takes land to build a highway, the beneficiaries will
not be everyone in the public, but only those who travel in that particular
geographic area (or, if the road happens to connect a commercial district,
those who purchase goods that can be delivered more cheaply via that high-
way). Much of the population-perhaps the great majority-will experience
no individual benefit at all. Nevertheless, such takings are routine. Any doc-
trinal argument implying that almost all exercises of eminent domain have
been unconstitutional is unlikely to be correct.
An added doctrinal difficulty is that the Supreme Court has explicitly
held that the amount of compensation owed for a taking is determined by
the size of the loss suffered by the owner of the taken property, not by the
size of the gain enjoyed by the taker. 72 In the emergency-destruction con-
text, the fact that fewer people benefited from the destruction than might
have benefited from some other taking-that is, that the benefit to the taker
(the public) was smaller than it might have been-does not make the loss of
169. Arguments of this sort may have seemed especially plausible in eras when firefighting
services were provided by private companies rather than by the government. In such circum-
stances, government-ordered destruction during a conflagration would look like a natural ex-
tension of what private persons were already doing.
170. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 cmt. j; see also Vincent v. Lake Erie
Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). The Vincent court did explicitly note that the issue
before it was not one in which "life or property was menaced by any object or thing belonging
to the plaintiff, the destruction of which became necessary to prevent the threatened disaster."
Vincent, 124 N.W. at 222. That remark implies the court's openness to the possibility that the
compensation requirement might differ in such a situation.
171. E.g., Stone v. Mayor of New York, 25 Wend. 157, 173-74 (N.Y. 1840) (opinion of
Verplanck, Sen.); 4f Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 74 (1853).
172. E.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548,
574 (1897).
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the destroyed property any less burdensome on the owner of that property,
and thus presumably should not reduce the amount of compensation owed.
Even setting that worry aside, however, a basic problem with the argu-
ment is its incomplete analysis of the assertion that private individuals do
not owe compensation for emergency destruction. Once one examines the
reasons why such an exemption might have existed for private individuals, it
becomes clear that, to the extent that those reasons are plausible at all, they
do not survive translation to the very different context of governmental
destruction.
As the passage quoted above from Russell v. Mayor of New York indi-
cates, the traditional justification for not requiring compensation in such
circumstances is that destroying property in an emergency to defend oneself
or others is a "natural right belonging to every individual." 73 Courts typi-
cally have not elaborated on the logic of this argument, but it implicitly takes
the assumed existence of such a natural right to imply that the destruction
was not wrongful, and therefore that there is no obligation to pay compen-
sation for that destruction. 74
This argument faces several difficulties. First, as noted in Part II, rectify-
ing wrongs is only one potential role for compensation. 75 Hence, this argu-
ment would be sound only if it provided some plausible explanation of why
none of compensation's other roles are present in emergency-destruction
situations. But no such explanation is offered, nor are there any obvious
candidates to fill that gap.
Second, the argument's appeal to natural rights as justifying the
noncompensation principle is question-begging. 76 From an initial assump-
tion that one has a natural right to destroy others' property to protect one's
own, these arguments simply jump to the conclusion that one has a natural
right to do so without paying compensation to the injured owner of the sacri-
ficed property. Those two rights are quite different, however, and accepting
the existence of the former does not itself settle whether the latter also exists.
Having the right to do something does not by itself entail having a right to
do it for free. For similar reasons, invoking "background principles" of prop-
erty law as limiting the scope of claims for compensation would offer little
173. 2 Denio 461, 473-74 (N.Y. 1845); see also Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 19
(1880); Am. Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L. 590, 605 (N.J. 1851) (opinion of Carpenter,
J.); id. at 615 (opinion of Randolph, J.); Lawrence, supra note 57, at 409-10.
174. For a modem discussion of the "natural right" argument, focusing on the initial
(1847) trial court opinion in the American Print Works litigation arising out of the Great New
York Fire of 1835, see Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. Rav. 1549, 1589-91 (2003).
175. See supra Section II.A.
176. Although a general debate over the propriety of appeals to natural law and natural
rights has continued for decades, the details of that debate are beyond the scope of this Article.
See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102
YALE L.J. 907 (1993); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175 (1955).
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illumination here. 177 It obviously is true that owners have no valid claim to
compensation for the loss of something to which they did not actually have
a right, and that existing doctrine exempts emergency destruction from
compensation. But that observation merely raises the question of the doc-
trine's soundness rather than resolving it. The descriptive observation that
the scope of property rights has some limitations does not itself offer any
insight into the normative question of what those limitations should be. 171
Moreover, the existence of a natural right to destroy property in emer-
gencies without paying compensation is implausible. Even if some natural
right of self-preservation permits inflicting injuries on others, it is difficult
to see how there could be a "natural" right to inflict more injury than neces-
sary. 1 79 If the presence of necessity creates a natural right to destroy, the
scope of that necessity would inherently limit the scope of the right.180 A key
fact to note then is that even when destruction is necessary to stop a confla-
gration or other emergency, the need to destroy the property does not itself
constitute a need to destroy the property without paying compensation. Stop-
ping the threat may be impossible without inflicting damage on property,
but paying compensation for the inflicted damage does not reduce the de-
struction's effectiveness at stopping fires. Hence, the need to stop a threat
does not by itself justify uncompensated destruction when compensated de-
struction is possible. Put another way, uncompensated destruction inflicts
more injury than is necessary to address the threat, since it leaves the victim
worse off than compensated destruction would and yet is no more effective
at ending the emergency. Because only compensated destruction is strictly
necessary, only that type of destruction can be justified by a natural right to
defend against that threat.
Since the natural-right justification for exempting private individuals
from an obligation to pay compensation for their acts of emergency destruc-
tion is unpersuasive, some alternative explanation for that exemption would
need to be found. The most plausible explanation springs from Part II's
177. For an influential example of the use of the term "background principles" in this
context, see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
178. Cf. Timothy M. Mulvaney, Foreground Principles, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 837 (2013)
(offering a general critique of the appeal to "background principles" to determine the scope of
constitutional protections of what ordinarily would seem to be property rights).
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("The
actor must use reasonable care to avoid doing unnecessary harm to persons or things .... ").
For judicial examples of this principle at work, see, e.g., Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 20
(1880); Barton-Barnes Inc. v. State, 583 N.Y.S.2d 547, 548 (App. Div. 1992) ("[Blefore the
converter can rely upon the public necessity doctrine to justify ultimate destruction of the
chattel it must demonstrate that reasonable efforts, albeit unsuccessful, were made at eradica-
tion [of the relevant threat], thus rendering destruction reasonably necessary.").
180. Dennis Klimchuk offers a similar argument. Interpreting and applying some remarks
by Hugo Grotius, Klimchuk suggests that a "duty to repair" arises in cases where "damaging
without compensation is an instance of taking more than one needs, as one would if one kept
property when all that was necessary was borrowing it, or destroyed it when merely using it
would have sufficed." Dennis Klimchuk, Property and Necessity, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 130, at 47, 55-56, 65.
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observation that an inability to pay compensation may give rise to a second
form of necessity-noncompensation necessity-and the amount of com-
pensation owed may accordingly decrease. When private individuals destroy
property to protect others, it is quite likely that those individuals will simply
be unable to pay, out of their own pockets, the amount of compensation
that would be required to make the owners of that property whole. There-
fore, a rule requiring individuals to pay for the costs of emergency destruc-
tion that they conducted to benefit others would both be intuitively unfair
and create a strong disincentive to destroying property in emergencies, even
when doing so would be very beneficial to society.'8 1 In short, it made sense
for common-law doctrine to hold individuals exempt from compensating
for reasonable destruction to address emergencies because in such circum-
stances two types of necessity were present, not just one. There was not only
the need to destroy the relevant property, but also a need for the individual
causing the destruction not to pay compensation, or at least not to pay full
compensation, for the resulting loss.
These fundamental features of emergency destruction as conducted by
private individuals are absent when public officials cause the destruction as
part of fulfilling their official duty to protect the public. The implausibility
of the incentives-based argument for the noncompensation principle in the
context of destruction by public officials has already been discussed. 8 2 Like-
wise, property taxes enable the government to internalize the benefits of
emergency destruction in ways that private individuals cannot. As a result,
emergency destruction by individuals is much more likely to merit an ex-
emption from liability to pay full compensation than government destruc-
tion is. Thus, the fact that private individuals sometimes have been
permitted to engage in uncompensated destruction does not imply that sim-
ilar permission is always appropriate for destruction by governments. Such
permission would be appropriate only when the government itself truly
faces noncompensation necessity as well as destruction necessity.
2. Military Necessity and the "Fortunes of War"
The arguments discussed so far have addressed emergency takings in
general. Historically, however, a distinct set of arguments has sought to jus-
tify the noncompensation principle in the specific context of military de-
struction during emergencies. These arguments often rest heavily, either
tacitly or explicitly, on a doctrine asserting that the government has no obli-
gation to pay compensation for property damaged or destroyed during the
ordinary course of a battle. 8 3
181. See supra Section III.A for a discussion of the noncompensation principle's effects on
incentives.
182. See supra Section III.A.
183. For a conventional statement of this doctrine, see EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v.
United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("It is axiomatic that the fifth amendment
is not suspended in wartime, but it is equally well recognized that a destruction of private
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One prominent example of this line of reasoning appeared in President
Grant's messages to Congress after vetoing three bills that would have paid
compensation for a handful of properties destroyed by the Union Army to
keep them out of Confederate hands.1 8 4 Grant's explanation for vetoing
compensation for the owners of the Manchester (Kentucky) Salt Works re-
lied heavily on the battle-damage exception:
[Ilt is difficult upon any ground of reason or justice to distinguish between
a case of [battle damage] and the one under consideration. Had General
Craft and his command destroyed the salt works by shelling out the enemy
found in their actual occupancy, the case would not have been different in
principle from the one presented in this bill. What possible difference can
it make in the rights of owners or the obligations of the Government
whether the destruction was in driving the enemy out or in keeping them
out of the possession of the salt works? 85
A variant of this argument appeared in the Supreme Court's decision
denying Caltex compensation for the Army's destruction of its Manila pe-
troleum facility during the Second World War. The Court argued that:
[h]ad the Army hesitated, had the facilities only been destroyed after re-
treat, respondents would certainly have no claims to compensation....
Nor do we think it legally significant that the destruction was effected prior
to withdrawal. The short of the matter is that this property, due to the
fortunes of war, had become a potential weapon of great significance to the
invader. It was destroyed, not appropriated for subsequent use. It was de-
stroyed that the United States might better and sooner destroy the
enemy.'86
There is an element of plausibility to these arguments, and it is useful to
identify exactly what it is and how it arises. Equally important, however, is
to see why each of these arguments is ultimately unsuccessful.
The Caltex passage contains two main arguments. 8 7 The final quoted
sentence's appeal to utility is unconvincing for reasons that by now are
familiar. It leaps from the premise that the destruction was useful to the
property in battle or by enemy forces is not compensable.") (quoting Nat'l Bd. of Young Men's
Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 396 F.2d 467, 470 (Ct. Cl. 1968))).
184. See President Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message (Feb. 11, 1873), in 7 A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 216, 216-17 (James D. Richard-
son ed., Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1898) [hereinafter MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS]
(vetoing Senate bill 161, "[a]n act for the relief of those suffering from the destruction of salt
works near Manchester, Ky., pursuant to the order of Major-General Carlos Buell"); President
Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message (Jan. 29, 1873), in 7 MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra, at
215, 215-16 (vetoing "[tlhe bill No. 490, entitled 'An act for the relief of the East Tennessee
University' "); President Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message (June 1, 1872), in 7 MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS, supra, at 172, 172-73 (vetoing "[ale act for the relief of J. Milton Best").
185. President Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message (Feb. 11, 1873), in 7 MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS, supra note 184, at 216, 217.
186. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 155 (1952).
187. The penultimate sentence of the quoted passage implies a brief third argument that
can quickly be dismissed. See id. Although it is true that the Caltex facility "was destroyed, not
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conclusion that no compensation is owed for the destruction. Even if the
Court is right that destroying Caltex's facility was useful, indeed so useful as
to have been necessary, that fact would show only that engaging in the de-
struction did not wrong the property owner, and therefore that the owner
was not entitled to restitution for a wrong. It would not, however, automati-
cally rule out all of the roles that Section II.A noted compensation plays in
such a situation, such as being a constitutive part of a legitimate taking. Nor
does the need to destroy the facility establish the existence of a noncompen-
sation necessity that would override those other sources of obligation. s
Grant's veto message offered a version of this utility argument that was
slightly more sophisticated but no more plausible. Grant sought to buttress
the analogy by pointing to a similarity in effect: "[The salt works'] destruc-
tion ... though not happening in actual conflict, was perhaps as disastrous
to the rebels as would have been a victory in battle."8 9 There are two general
reasons to doubt the assertion that because the destruction had the same
usefulness as a victory in battle it therefore should be treated similarly for
the purposes of determining whether there is an obligation to pay compen-
sation. First, from a doctrinal perspective, a well-established principle of tak-
ings law is that the amount of compensation to be paid is determined by the
size of the loss to the person whose property is taken, not by the gain to the
taker.90 Hence, determining whether compensation is owed by invoking the
taking's great usefulness to the taker is precisely the opposite of the ordinary
approach in assessing takings compensation.
A second, more general problem is that the argument proves too much.
For example, taking land to build a water purification plant may be just as
useful as prohibiting a factory from polluting a lake. Since it is uncontrover-
sial that the government may prohibit that pollution without paying com-
pensation (in an ordinary exercise of its police power), the comparable-
usefulness argument would imply that therefore the government does not
owe compensation for the land taken to build the purification plant. But of
course that sort of confiscation is a paradigm of ordinary eminent domain,
for which just compensation is required.
appropriated for subsequent use," it has long been established that the government owes com-
pensation for property that it destroys under ordinary circumstances no less than property
that it expropriates to use under those circumstances. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 48 (1960); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946). Hence, the Court's
observation is irrelevant as a general analysis of takings. If, alternatively, it was intended to
suggest that the difference between destruction and use has a distinct, special significance in
emergency situations, then it is question-begging. Whether emergency confiscations for use
and emergency destruction should be treated differently with respect to compensation is the
very question to be answered, and noting that those two situations are not the same, while
obviously true, equally obviously merely raises the question rather than answering it.
188. See supra Section II.B.
189. President Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message (Feb. 11, 1873), in 7 MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS, supra note 184, at 216, 217.
190. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943) ("Since the owner is to
receive no more than indemnity for his loss, his award cannot be enhanced by any gain to the
taker.").
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The Caltex Court's other main argument echoes Grant's assertion that
because the government would not have owed compensation for destroying
property controlled by the enemy, therefore it must not owe compensation
for destroying property that was not yet controlled by the enemy but even-
tually would be. Even if this argument is convincing, its scope is inherently
limited to situations in which capture by the enemy was inevitable. Although
that happened to be true when U.S. forces retreated from Manila in 1941, in
other situations, in which capture by the enemy was only probable or possi-
ble, it is not obvious that the argument would still apply. 91
Nor does the Caltex Court's invocation of the "fortunes of war" help
advance its conclusion. No doubt it was Caltex's bad luck that its facilities
would be useful to an enemy army in wartime and that an enemy army was
nearby. It was also Caltex's bad luck that destroying the facility was neces-
sary to slow that army's advance. As noted in Section II.B, however, the
question whether destruction is permissible is distinct from the question
whether compensation is owed for such destruction. As a result, the asser-
tion that it is Caltex's "bad luck" that the government needed to destroy the
Manila facility, even if accepted, would not by itself justify refusing to com-
pensate for the destruction of that facility: one could just as easily say that it
is the public's bad luck that to slow an advancing army it needs to destroy an
American's property, and thus it is the public's bad luck that it will have to
pay compensation to that owner.
Moreover, bad luck is hardly unique to the emergency-destruction situ-
ation. Indeed, it is characteristic even of ordinary eminent-domain cases, for
which compensation uncontroversially is required: although it is Jones's bad
luck that her house is right in the path of the best route on which to build a
new highway, the Fifth Amendment still requires compensating Jones for
her house if the government condemns it to build the highway. Ultimately,
these sorts of invocations of luck are unilluminating because they are inher-
ently symmetric: if one can say that someone is unlucky that the public
needs to destroy or confiscate that person's property, then one could equally
well say that the public is unlucky that circumstances will force it to destroy
or confiscate property for which it must pay compensation.
The same flaw lies at the heart of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
influential assertion, in dicta in Respublica v. Sparhawk, that no compensa-
tion is owed for emergency destruction because "[iut is a rule ... that it is
better to suffer a private mischief, than a public inconvenience."192 (The
particular claim at issue in Sparhawk was for the loss of goods during the
191. This would especially be true when the government's actions made the capture more
likely. The history of the wartime-noncompensation principle offers some prominent exam-
ples sharing a basic ironic form: the government had collected and relocated portable property
to avoid its capture by an advancing enemy, only to see that enemy later capture the location
where all of that property had conveniently been concentrated, thereby insuring that none of it
would escape the enemy's grasp. See Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851)
(addressing loss of property in the Mexican-American War); Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 DalU.
357 (Pa. 1788) (addressing loss of property in the American War for Independence).
192. 1 Dal. at 362.
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American War for Independence, caused by the government's attempt to
prevent the goods' capture by British forces.) One could just as easily say
that being obliged to contribute, via taxes, to compensating the owner of the
destroyed property is a "private mischief' that is better to suffer than the
"public inconvenience" of leaving members of the community at risk of be-
ing made destitute for the benefit of others. Alternatively, if what the Spar-
hawk court really meant was that it was better for one person to suffer an
injury than for the public to suffer from losing the war, then the court con-
flated destruction necessity with noncompensation necessity. It is a false di-
chotomy to assert that the state must choose between, on the one hand,
paying compensation to mitigate the "private mischief' of suffering lost
property and, on the other hand, avoiding the "public inconvenience" of
allowing the enemy to capture useful goods. The state could both take the
property and pay compensation.' 93
The symmetry problem is not limited to luck-based justifications of the
noncompensation principle. It applies equally to the battle-damage excep-
tion in general. Accepting the assertion that battle damage and wartime
emergency destruction are relevantly similar does not automatically lead to
the conclusion that compensation is owed for neither, as Grant and the
Caltex Court assume. Logically, an equally possible alternative is that com-
pensation should be paid for both. Determining which of those two conclu-
sions makes more sense, or whether the two situations are in fact relevantly
disanalogous (despite having some similarities), requires considering what
the battle-damage exception's fundamental justification is in the first place.
This question has drawn surprisingly little attention. Those who invoke the
exception typically seem content to take its existence as a given. 94
The most plausible justification rests on the practical difficulty of re-
quiring compensation-that is, using the terminology introduced in Section
II.B, it rests on the presence of administrative-noncompensation necessity. 195
Soldiers cannot afford to spend time in the midst of battle recording which
property damage was caused by which side. Indeed, it often will be difficult
to know which side was responsible for specific damage suffered by property
caught in a battle's crossfire, and there is no guarantee that those who do
happen to know will survive the conflict. Even if everyone acts fully in good
193. It is possible that the Sparhawk court in fact was tacitly motivated by concerns about
noncompensation necessity and simply failed to articulate them. Although the court did not
address the question of financial exigency, Pennsylvania's attorney general had explicitly raised
the issue. After listing several different types of emergency destruction that had occurred dur-
ing the war, he asserted that if the property owner won in this case, those other owners would
be entitled to compensation as well, and then asked rhetorically, "What nation could sustain
the enormous load of debt which so ruinous a doctrine would create!" Id. at 362.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 234 (1887); Nat'l Bd. of Young
Men's Christian Ass'ns v. United States, 396 F.2d 467, 470 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
195. Another possible justification for the battle-damage exception is that the owner of
property destroyed in battle has already received nonmonetary compensation in the form of
the sacrifices that his fellow nationals have themselves made for the war effort. But this at-
tempted justification is implausible for the same basic reasons that reciprocal advantage argu-
ments in these circumstances generally are implausible. See supra Section III.C.1.
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faith, these facts would make any accurate allocation of compensation im-
possible, and the temptation of opportunism would multiply the difficulties.
At least some self-interested property owners might be expected to present
claims for damage caused by the other side or that had already existed when
the battle began. Thus, destruction necessity is not the only form of neces-
sity present in battles. The practical infeasibility of administering a compen-
sation program for battle damage gives rise to administrative-
noncompensation necessity as well.
Moreover, fiscal-noncompensation necessity likely would also be pre-
sent. The amount of battle damage in modern warfare is so great that the
costs of fully compensating everyone who lost property as a result of the
conflict, even if limited to those whose losses were caused by allied militar-
ies, would potentially be astronomical. 9 6 As a result, the government simply
could not function properly if it were compelled to pay full compensation,
nor could the country bear the economic dislocation caused by com-
pounding the effects of war with a huge tax levy to raise the revenue neces-
sary to make the relevant owners whole. These fiscal concerns explicitly
motivated Grant's unwillingness to allow Congress to open the political
door to broader claims for compensation, and they presumably have loomed
large in the aftermath of many wars. 9 7 For example, in addressing the issue
of compensation for property destroyed during the Civil War, the Supreme
Court approvingly quoted Emmerich de Vattel's assertion that property
losses suffered as a result of "inevitable necessity," such as "destruction
caused by the artillery in retaking a town from the enemy," did not require
compensation because "[w] ere the state strictly to indemnify all those whose
property is injured in this manner, the public finances would soon be ex-
hausted, and every individual in the state would be obliged to contribute his
share in due proportion, a thing utterly impracticable." 98
If this in fact is the justification for the battle-damage exception, or at
least a reasonable approximation of that justification, then battle-damage
losses are noncompensable not because those losses have some inherent
characteristic that deprives their victims of any just claim for assistance from
the community that benefited from the imposition of those losses, but
rather because battle-damage losses typically occur in situations in which
destruction necessity is accompanied by noncompensation necessity. In a
more ideal world, compensation for battle damage would be feasible, and
196. One estimate suggests that the financial and economic cost of the Second World War
to the United States alone was approximately $350 billion (unadjusted for inflation), while the
total costs for all participants were estimated to be five times greater than those of the First
World War. See R. ERNEST DuPuY & TREVOR N. Dupuy, THE HARPER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MILITARYHISTORY 1309 (4th ed. 1993). Adjusting for inflation, $350 billion in 1945 dollars is
approximately equal to $4.6 trillion today. See MEASURINGWORTH.COM, http://www.measur-
ingworth.com/uscompare (last visited Aug. 26, 2015) (calculating inflation adjustments based
on the purchasing power of dollars in 1945 and today).
197. See infra Part IV.
198. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. at 234-35 (quoting 2 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW bk. III, ch. 15, § 232 (1758)).
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then it would be owed. Thus, the presence of noncompensation necessity is
the key to the existence of the battle-damage exception.
As a result, whether the battle-damage exception's scope plausibly ex-
tends to wartime emergency destruction depends ultimately on whether the
two sources of noncompensation necessity arise in conjunction with emer-
gency destruction as much as they do in conjunction with ordinary battle
damage.
Administrative-noncompensation necessity clearly does not. The sorts
of practical difficulties that constitute an insuperable obstacle to administer-
ing a compensation system for battle damage are much less likely to arise in
the emergency-destruction context. One reason is that the necessary infor-
mation is likely to be much more easily available in the emergency-destruc-
tion case. When the U.S. Army destroyed Caltex's petroleum facility in
Manila, its personnel knew exactly what they were destroying, and that they
were the ones who were destroying it. Concerns about the confusion im-
posed by battle obviously do not arise when the destruction occurs before a
battle takes place. 99 Likewise, the risk of opportunistic dishonesty is much
less, since the government can easily determine whether the property that it
is about to demolish had in fact already been demolished. To be sure, there
still could be a risk that the property's owner would overstate the property's
predestruction material condition in an effort to inflate the amount of com-
pensation received, knowing that the government did not have time to thor-
oughly inspect the premises before the demolition. Although that problem
seems inescapable, it is unlikely to be large, because government officials
who are scrambling to deal with an emergency are unlikely to spend pre-
cious time and resources demolishing property that seemed unlikely to be in
good enough condition for the enemy to find it useful. Thus, a natural limit
exists to the amount of value-inflation that even an unscrupulous owner
could attempt to create.
Since administrative noncompensation necessity is unlikely to be a sig-
nificant concern in practice, only when the second, fiscal variety of noncom-
pensation necessity is present would compensation for emergency
destruction not be required. Although that necessity might sometimes char-
acterize wartime emergency destruction, it would not do so in all cases. For
example, while it might justify not paying full compensation in the after-
math of major wars such as the Civil War or the Second World War, it
would not plausibly apply to much smaller military conflicts such as the
1983 U.S. raid on Grenada or the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama.200
Moreover, even within a large war, the frequency of emergency destruc-
tion is likely to be quite low. Militaries focus on destroying enemy forces and
property, not on destroying their own nationals' property. The number of
199. This point should not be overstated, however. Administrative-noncompensation ne-
cessity potentially could arise in disaster contexts, especially with respect to demolition of
property that is less prominent than a huge petroleum facility. See supra note 68.
200. For brief summaries of the Grenada and Panama operations, see 2 CTR. OF MILITARY
HISTORY, U.S. ARMY, AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 395-402 (Richard W. Stewart ed., 2005).
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occasions on which emergency destruction would be militarily useful will
almost certainly be dwarfed by the amount of ordinary battle damage that
occurs in a conflict. Since emergency destruction is likely to be much more
rare than ordinary battle damage, there would be much less of a burden
placed on the public treasury by paying full compensation for emergency
destruction. Therefore, a categorical denial of such compensation would rest
on an unwarranted assumption about the ubiquity of noncompensation ne-
cessity. In situations where noncompensation necessity genuinely is present,
however, either because the necessary demolitions themselves were so de-
structive or, more likely, because the destruction occurred in the context of a
widespread conflict or catastrophe that placed severe constraints on public
finances, merely partial compensation might be all that is required. Whether
those circumstances exist in a given case will depend on the specific facts of
that case and therefore cannot reliably be predicted in advance.
Some might worry about the equity of granting even partial compensa-
tion to owners of property lost through emergency destruction while cate-
gorically denying compensation to owners of property lost through ordinary
battle damage. Such a concern would not be justified. As noted earlier, in an
ideal world it would be possible to compensate even those who suffered
battle damage, but unfortunately practical obstacles stand in the way of such
compensation, obstacles that do not typically exist for emergency destruc-
tion. The fact that it is impossible to treat everyone fairly does not give the
government license not to treat fairly those it can.
IV. HISTORY IN CONTEXT
It should now be evident that the noncompensation principle is, strictly
speaking, incorrect. When the government destroys property to address an
emergency, it in fact does owe compensation to the owner of the destroyed
property. Nevertheless, the principle does contain a grain of truth, because
when noncompensation necessity is present in the aftermath of an emer-
gency, the required amount of compensation may be merely partial
compensation.
Today, however, it is common to assert not only that the opposite is
true-that is, that no compensation is owed for emergency takings-but
also that this noncompensation principle has been well-established law for
centuries. If, as one court said, "[t]he emergency exception has had a long
and consistent history in both state and federal courts," the natural question
that follows is why so many courts in so many contexts have embraced a
conclusion that this Article argues is incorrect.201
The answer is that, in fact, this supposed history of the noncompensa-
tion principle is inaccurate. Although space does not permit a detailed ex-
amination of the principle's historical development, it is possible briefly to
note three key themes that emerge from examining that history in context.
Taken together, they indicate both that the doctrine's history does not
201. Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 909 (Cal. 1995) (en banc).
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straightforwardly lead to today's noncompensation principle, and that the
distinctions drawn in this Article are not only conceptually important but
also practically significant.
First, case history displays marked ambivalence about the requirement
to compensate. As the discussion so far has made evident, many cases have
said that compensation is not owed. Historically, however, not every court
has agreed. Although their justification for suggesting that compensation is
owed has rarely risen above appeals to intuitive fairness, some courts have in
fact stated (albeit sometimes in dicta) that they found the noncompensation
principle implausible.
For example, in Mitchell v. Harmony, a case arising out of the Mexican-
American War, the Supreme Court asserted that sometimes "private prop-
erty may lawfully be... destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands
of the public enemy," but added that "[u]nquestionably, in such cases, the
government is bound to make full compensation to the owner."202 Similarly,
in Mayor of New York v. Lord, a prominent case arising out of the Great New
York Fire of 1835, a New York court asserted that
houses may be pulled down, or bulwarks raised for the preservation and
defense of the country, without subjecting the persons concerned to an
action, the same as pulling down houses in time of fire; and yet these are
common cases where the sufferers would be entitled to compensation from
the national government within the constitutional principle.20 3
Thus, the assertion that the noncompensation principle has a "long and
consistent" history is only half right. Although the history is long, it has not
been consistent. In light of that inconsistency, one can sympathize with the
Caltex Court's assertion that "[n]o rigid rules can be laid down to distin-
guish compensable losses from noncompensable losses. Each case must be
judged on its own facts. 2 °4
Second, as the passage quoted from Lord suggests, many of the seminal
nineteenth-century cases endorsing the noncompensation principle ad-
dressed the question whether a public official could personally be held liable
to pay compensation out of his own pocket, rather than whether the govern-
ment would owe compensation.2 0 s This was not a coincidence. As Robert
Brauneis notes, until the late nineteenth century, lawsuits against individual
202. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1851) (dictum).
203. Mayor of New York v. Lord, 17 Wend. 285, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 18 Wend. 126
(N.Y. 1837). Even the dissent in the case agreed that "[tlhe destruction of individual property,
for the public safety, bears a strong analogy to the case of taking private property for the
public use." Id. at 303 (Bronson, J., dissenting). Further examples of judicial skepticism about
the noncompensation principle are, of course, available in opinions dissenting from judgments
that endorsed that principle. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156-57
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
204. Caltex, 344 U.S. at 156 (majority opinion).
205. See, e.g., Mitchell, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115; Am. Print Works v. Lawrence, 23 N.J.L.
590, 609 (N.J. 1851) (addressing the personal liability of New York's mayor for property lost in
the creation of a firebreak); Lord, 17 Wend. at 285.
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persons were the standard vehicle for claims seeking compensation under
state law for property taken through eminent domain. (Suing the govern-
ment directly for compensation was, at the time, thought not to be
possible.) 0 6
As noted earlier, concerns about inefficient incentives, public officials'
inability to afford payment, and the basic unfairness of forcing an official to
bear personally the costs of actions taken to benefit others all are good rea-
sons not to impose personal liability on public officials for emergency de-
struction.20 7 Those reasons lose their relevance, however, when the issue
changes from individual liability to government liability, since governments
have the ability to raise tax revenue and can internalize the benefits of the
destruction as well as the costs. 08 The holdings in those earlier cases cannot
simply be plucked out of their original context of concerns about individual
liability and dropped into the very different modern context of governmen-
tal obligations to pay compensation.
Third, many of the key cases holding that no compensation is owed
were decided in circumstances characterized by a high degree of noncom-
pensation necessity. For example, in United States v. Pacific Railroad, an 1887
case that the Caltex court would later rely on, the Supreme Court declared
that compensation was not required for property lost as a result of emer-
gency destruction during the Civil War.20 9 It is noteworthy that the Court's
language explicitly limited this assertion to that particular war: "The princi-
ple that, for injuries to or destruction of private property in necessary mili-
tary operations during the civil war, the government is not responsible is
thus considered established. '" 210 That the Court would be particularly con-
cerned about Civil War claims is easily understandable in context, because
concerns about fiscal-noncompensation necessity in the war's aftermath had
been quite prominent. A large portion of the Court's discussion focused on
a detailed history of a message, "much discussed in the Senate," that had
accompanied President Grant's veto of a bill that would have provided com-
pensation to one specific individual, J. Milton Best, whose home the Union
Army had destroyed to prevent its capture by Confederate forces.21' Grant's
message explicitly stated that fiscal concerns had motivated his veto:
It can not be denied that the payment of this claim would invite the pres-
entation of demands for very large sums of money; and such is the sup-
posed magnitude of the claims that may be made against the Government
206. See Brauneis, supra note 71, at 67-68. Brauneis observes that this approach made
some intuitive sense at the time, because a "large portion of nineteenth-century just compen-
sation litigation ... involved corporate defendants. Everyone expected that turnpike, canal,
and railroad corporations, and usually municipal corporations as well, would bear the costs of
property acquired for their benefit." Id. at 107.
207. See supra Section III.A.
208. See supra Section III.A.
209. 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887).
210. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. at 239.
211. Id. at 236-39.
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for necessary and unavoidable destruction of property by the Army that I
deem it proper to return this bill for reconsideration. 212
Grant made his concerns about unsustainable fiscal burdens even clearer a
few months after that message, when he vetoed a similar bill that would have
compensated a very sympathetic petitioner:
If the precedent is once established that the Government is liable for the
ravages of war, the end of demands upon the public Treasury can not be
forecast .... [N]othing but regard for my duty to the whole people, in
opposing a principle which, if allowed, will entail greater burdens upon the
whole than the relief which will be afforded to a part, by allowing this bill
to become a law, could induce me to return it with objections. 2 13
The Pacific Railroad Court's discussion, with its specific focus on the
remarkable circumstances of the Civil War, thus left open the question
whether compensation might still be owed in contexts in which noncom-
pensation necessity was not as severe. Indeed, the Court itself quoted, with
apparent approbation, Vattel's general assertion that compensation in fact is
owed for property destruction "done by the state deliberately and by way of
precaution. '2 14 Thus, Pacific Railroad is properly understood not as stating a
universal principle of noncompensation, but rather only a judgment tailored
to the particular circumstances of the nation as it pieced itself back together
after the Civil War.
Likewise, the Court decided Caltex against a backdrop not only of the
extraordinary devastation of the Second World War, but also of the start of
the Cold War and the continuation of the quite hot war in Korea, a war that
by 1952 had already involved two desperate retreats by U.S. forces and had
no end in sight.215 Indeed, just six months before Justice Vinson issued his
majority opinion in Caltex, his dissent in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case) had openly reflected anxiety about the onset
of the Cold War: "Those who suggest that this is a case involving extraordi-
nary powers should be mindful that these are extraordinary times. A world
not yet recovered from the devastation of World War II has been forced to
face the threat of another and more terrifying global conflict."216
In such a context, not requiring the government to pay full compensa-
tion was understandable, since at the time it was tacitly but universally as-
sumed that the only alternative to full compensation was zero
212. President Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message (June 1, 1872), in 7 MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS, supra note 184, at 172, 172-73.
213. President Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message (Jan. 29, 1873), in 7 MESSAGES OF THE
PRESIDENTS, supra note 184, at 215, 215; see also President Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message
(Feb. 11, 1873), in 7 MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 184, at 216, 216-17 (reiterating
these concerns).
214. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. at 234.
215. See generally T.R. FEHRENBACH, THIS KIND OF WAR 147-56 (1963).
216. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 668 (1952) (Vinson, C.J.,
dissenting). Justices Reed and Minton joined that dissent; both joined Vinson in the majority
in Caltex.
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compensation. Faced with circumstances compelling the state to take de-
structive actions for which practical necessity precluded paying full compen-
sation, such courts understandably chose the only alternative that existing
doctrine seemed to allow them, namely denying compensation altogether.
As a result, the fact that many courts confronting questions having grave
fiscal implications found it plausible to exempt the government from an
obligation to pay full compensation ultimately reveals little about the plausi-
bility of an alternative rule that acknowledges that when noncompensation
necessity accompanies destruction necessity, merely partial compensation
may be all that justice requires for emergency takings.
CONCLUSION
The Article began by arguing that three commonly overlooked distinc-
tions are crucial for understanding what compensation is owed when the
government destroys property out of "necessity" to address an emergency.
The first distinction points out that there are several different roles that
compensation may play in any given interaction. The second distinction
identifies two different types of "necessity," each with distinct normative
implications. Destruction necessity permits the destruction of private prop-
erty even over the objections of its owner, while noncompensation necessity
permits not making the owner of the destroyed property whole. And the
third distinction moves beyond the standard all-or-nothing dichotomy be-
tween awarding full compensation and zero compensation, developing the
alternative possibility that sometimes the proper amount of compensation
lies somewhere between those two extremes.
These three distinctions prove illuminating in examining the wide range
of arguments that have been offered to support the assertion that owners of
property destroyed by the government in emergencies are owed no compen-
sation at all. That examination reveals that those arguments, and the conclu-
sion that they sought to support, lack persuasive force.
Moreover, the significance of these three distinctions extends beyond
revealing critical weaknesses in justifications of the noncompensation prin-
ciple. The distinctions also point to a more plausible account, one that best
makes sense of the law in light of considerations of justice: when necessity
compels the government to demolish property to address an emergency, the
demolition does not wrong the demolished property's owner unless com-
pensation is not paid. Compensation's role in takings cases thus is not to
rectify a wrong, but rather to prevent a wrong from occurring in the first
place. Hence the mere presence of destruction necessity is insufficient to
eliminate the government's general obligation to compensate the owners of
property that it destroys. But when inescapable fiscal or administrative con-
straints make full compensation infeasible-that is, when noncompensation
necessity is also present-then although the obligation to pay just compen-
sation remains, the amount of that compensation changes. Under such cir-
cumstances, what justice requires for emergency takings is partial
compensation.
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